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Abstract
This study extends the empirical evidence of hedge fund activism impact on tar-
get firm performance. We investigate whether activism strategies as well as their
effects have changed following the recent financial crisis of 2007–2008. The analysis
is based on the U.S. data covering 112 hedge funds, 551 target firms, from 2000
to 2013. We find that returns to activism accrue to approximately 5% during the
(–20, +5) event window. Activism–related categories that generate significant and
positive abnormal returns include capital structure, business strategy, and general
undervaluation. Since the financial crisis, business-related activism generates the
highest returns, followed by activism in financially depressed firms. We also find
significant cross-sectional abnormal returns, both before and during the crisis, for
hedge funds who do not pre-specify an objective. One year post–activism perfor-
mance suggests that target firms experience substantial improvement in value, profit
margin, and investment.
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1 Introduction
Despite the tremendous growth in the US hedge fund industry following the global fi-
nancial crisis, merely a few studies have empirically attempted to gauge the effects of
the crisis on fund–targeted firms.1 The financial crisis, on setting around mid-2007,
undeniably challenges the traditional approach to activism due to additional regulatory
bindings and a much competitive environment to the viability of fund activism. In
addition, the crisis allows testing if there are any material changes in funds’ targeting
patterns and ways to influencing the firm’s internal governance. This study examines
the impact of the recent crisis by investigating whether activist funds have changed the
targeting behavior and the firms’ performance in the short-run and the long-term.
In their seminal study, Berle and Means (1932) posit that dispersed shareholders with
a negligible ownership stake in sizeable US corporations assert less likely any significant
influence by their monitoring. Modern corporate finance literature introduces distinct
mechanisms to keep an adequate due diligence on the firm’s management. The emphasis
of such arrangements is to align the manager’s interest with those of shareholders to alle-
viate the associated agency issues – however, empirical evidence suggests that so far these
measures have appeared less successful in mitigating the agency problems (Baker et al.,
1988). Of these monitoring means, the inclusion of blockholder is proposed on behalf of
diffused shareholders (Jensen, 1986); however, the evolved outcomes have been econom-
ically insignificant (Wahal, 1996; Karpoff et al., 1996; Black, 1998; Carleton et al., 1998;
Romano, 2001). The limited role of such monitoring has been subjected to free riding
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Black, 1998; Kahan and Rock, 2007; Partnoy and Thomas,
2007), high cost (Black, 1998; Kahan and Rock, 2007), limited investment (Black, 1998;
Karpoff, 2001; Parrino et al., 2003), weak financial incentives (Rock, 1990), regulatory
constraints (Romano, 2001), conflict of interest (Davis and Kim, 2005), among others.2
The activist hedge fund has successfully drawn considerable attention from both aca-
demics and industry through its effective monitoring and delivering substantial perfor-
mance. The very organizational framework, including fewer regulations (Ackermann
et al., 1999), relaxed taxations (Jaeger, 2003), sophisticated investment strategies, for
example leverage, short selling, derivatives, and concentrated portfolios (Partnoy and
1According to Hedge Fund Research (HFR) report, a leading research firm in hedge funds, the assets
under management in the industry have reached up to $2.9 trillion in first quarter of 2016 for more than
12,000 funds, [1]https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/
2These shortcomings or constraints have been widely discussed in non-hedge fund literature.
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Thomas, 2007), (Jaeger, 2003, p. 133), and performance–based incentives (Ackermann
et al., 1999) allows it to outperform other non-hedge funds. Contrary to limitations
associated with non-hedge funds, a growing body of fund-related literature argues for
its distinctive characteristics and presents it as a leading candidate in a monitoring
role (Bratton, 2006; Briggs, 2007; Kahan and Rock, 2007; Partnoy and Thomas, 2007;
Armour et al., 2009). Despite the crisis period, hedge fund related activism has per-
sistently been generating positively significant abnormal returns for its investors (Becht
et al., 2014).
The impact of hedge fund activism on target firms’ performance has rigorously been
discussed and studied in recent decades (Klein and Zur, 2006; Brav et al., 2008; Green-
wood and Schor, 2009; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Bebchuk et al., 2014). The em-
pirical findings of largely documented studies are consistent with the notion that fund-
related activism generates positively significant abnormal returns around the announce-
ment of Schedule 13D Disclosures. However, the evidence on long-term firm’s perfor-
mance is mixed and partly subjects to sample frame and composition.
A general consensus exists among the researchers that the stock market favorably
reacts to the announcement of a fund’s involvement in a target firm, and as a result,
generates positively significant abnormal returns (Klein and Zur, 2006; Brav et al., 2008;
Boyson and Mooradian, 2011). In pre-crisis sample studies, Klein and Zur (2006) re-
port 10.3% abnormal returns over a relatively longer (–30, +30) event window including
the date of notification. In another study, Greenwood and Schor (2009) utilizing long-
horizon data (1993–2006), document 3.5% abnormal returns in 15 days event–window.
To add more evidence, Brav et al. (2008) show seven percentage points abnormal re-
turns in excess of matching firms based on size/book-to-market/industry in (–20, +20)
event window and find no reversal in prices in the succeeding year of activism. The
announcement related positively significant abnormal returns have signaled the market
participants to reconsider traditionally prevailing thinking on activist investing. Re-
cently, Becht et al. (2014) analyze stock performance across regions, including Asia,
Europe, and North America, and report that the US market responds most to fund
disclosures about 6.9% for (–20, +20) event window or 41 days.
Related to long-term performance in targets firms, the empirical evidence, however,
is mixed and largely subjects to the sample frame and composition. In a seminal study,
Brav et al. (2008) analyze the two-years post-activism changes in firms and find that tar-
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gets have outperformed the nontargets in terms of profitability and payout when matched
at industry/size/book to market value. In addition, they also find that at the gover-
nance level, targets experience higher CEO turnover following the activism. Boyson and
Mooradian (2011) using a relatively longer panel from 1994 to 2007, and document that
target firms’ value improved when measured using Tobin’s Q over the course of activism.
Moreover, targets significantly reduced the excess cash thus showing the consistency in
the widespread idea that activists reduce the agency costs of managerial discretion. Con-
trary to these findings, some studies report either adverse effects or no improvement in
the target firms following the activism. Klein and Zur (2006), for instance, do not find
evidence of improvement in firms’ accounting measures of performance. Instead, targets
experience a decline in earnings per share (EPS), return on assets (ROA), and return
on equity (ROE) in the succeeding fiscal year. However, post-activism targets’ excess
cash reduced substantially and distributed among shareholders as dividends. The mixed
findings on long-term effect along with significant abnormal returns in the short-run
suggest that the shareholders perceive benefits to reducing agency costs of excess cash
and short-term investments.
Using a hand-collected data for 112 hedge funds, 551 event firms over the period of
2000 to 2013, we study the impact of activism in two broadly distinctive perspectives;
in general for the entire sample period and in particular for the crisis period. Related
to activism, we are interested in to investigate whether the targeted firms are valued or
growth stock. In addition, how activists do attempt to impact the internal governance
of targets by influencing their managerial decisions? Are there any observable changes
to targeting patterns following the crisis? Does crisis affect the returns to activism?
In the case of a significant visible change in targeting trends, we extend to investigate
how does activists’ target perform differently than non–hedge funds’ target? Some of
these concerns have been partly discussed in prior fund-related literature (Klein and Zur,
2006; Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011). In this study, we emphasis on
addressing these questions testing the crisis effect in particular.
The activist hedge fund usually acquires a significant ownership stake in target firms
to assert its influence strategically on a firm’s management. In doing so, they normally
target small and medium-sized firms. Targeting relatively a small-cap firm allows a fund
to acquire a meaningful stake and induce pressure on management to consider their
suggested measures in serious manners. In our sample, the characteristics of the targets
demonstrate that the firms are, on average, small and medium-sized. In addition, they
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resemble value stock; underperforming and have potential in price to reflect the true
intrinsic value, however, financially profitable and operationally stronger than peers in
the industry. Moreover, target firms are highly leveraged and hold liquid assets com-
pared to matching firms. Previously documented studies, including Brav et al. (2008);
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) report firms with less market capitalization and value
stock highly likely prone to the fund activism.
Activist targets a firm with a pre-specified plan of actions. When a fund exceeds a
threshold of 5% or more ownership stake in a firm, it reports a mandatory file known as
Schedule 13D to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the US. In 13D notifica-
tion, it identifies undervaluation and explicitly proposes potential changes to the firm.
Targets have been experiencing positive and constructive support from activists during
the activism. The funds’ interventions are positively perceived by the market, and as
a result, market appreciates the stock price in the short–run. The empirical findings of
our study are consistent with the prior literature on documenting the short-run value
creation around the announcement window. We find that in the short–run, target firms’
cumulative abnormal returns around the longest (–20, +5) event window, exhibit 5.34%
appreciation in stock returns, which is in line with prior documented studies on fund
activism.
We examine the market reaction to various types of activism and analyze the cross-
section of short–run abnormal returns. We find that market appreciates most the in-
tervention by an activist suggesting changes to the capital structure in a target. The
announcement-related returns (12.2%) accrue to activism in which a fund initially pro-
poses to reduce the firm’s excess cash in order to mitigate the agency-related issues or
repurchases of outstanding stocks and restructuring of the debts. This finding is consis-
tent with the crisis period and suggests potential in targeting financially depressed firms.
Following restructuring capital in firms, funds who manifest to change the target firms’
business course, including operational efficiency or to gain favorable terms for mergers
and acquisitions, manage to earn 9.2% returns in excess of the matching peers. In addi-
tion to these propositions, fund filing 13D announcement without a pre-specifying plan
are rewarded by 2.8% returns, which indicates that without any preemptive measure,
yet market considers the activist involvement as a positive signal for the target. We do
not find a meaningful reaction of the market to the type of activism which relates to the
sale of the target. In the wake of the financial crisis, spinning off some noncore asset or
whole firm is seen as the norm for fund activism; however, we do not find any statistically
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significant impact for such activity. The type of activism associated with governance is-
sues, including ousting existing CEO or restructuring BOD, generates positive returns.
However, we find once again a lack of statistical significance. In sum, the market re-
sponds more to funds’ pre-specified plan as compared to non-confrontational approaches.
Since the financial crisis, the business–related activism promises the highest returns,
approximately 15% which is statistically significant at 5% level. Funds, intervening in
target’s business by suggesting measures to improve operational efficiency which may
include restructuring of business or recommending appropriate terms for anticipated
mergers and acquisitions during the crisis, generate most returns. Another notable find-
ing is a positive market reaction to the activist’s involvement in financially depressed
firms, which appears common notion during the crisis. In cases where activists target
firms which have filed their cases in bankruptcy courts under Chapter 11 during the cri-
sis period, appeared potential venue to generate approximately 10% abnormal returns,
however merely marginally significant. In a relatively short–period (–10, +10) event win-
dow, funds without any intent of serving active role earn more than 9% which is highly
significant. Unlike previously gained results, we do not find any statistical significance
for the abnormal returns for capital structure–related activism.
While analyzing the long–term one-year performance of the target firms, we use two
distinctive approaches including propensity score matching and difference-in-difference
approach on both dimensions– time-series and cross-sectional settings. The initial find-
ings for entire sample period suggest that targets outperform their matching firms in
terms of valuation, profitability, and in prospects of investment. One year after activism,
targets experience substantial improvement in Tobin’s Q and this increase in also evi-
denced by the book–to–market value for which the difference in median observation is
statistically distinguishable from zero. We also find that targets partly reduced their
leverage. These findings are consistent with the documented literature and support the
view that fund suggested measures in targets lead the stock price to reflect its funda-
mentals and thus help to enhance the firm value in long-term.
The targets long-term performance yield mixed results when we account for crisis
effect in our analysis. Using difference–in–difference approach, we examine the crisis
impact on firm’s performance for the entire sample and a subsample of targeted firms
during 2006 and 2007. For full sample analysis, we find that targets on average experi-
ence significant increase in measures used for size, valuation, and investment. However,
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following the crisis, targets suffer in terms of profit margin coupled with an increase in
debt capacity. For a subsample of firms targeted during 2006 and 2007, the two years
long–term performance in 2008 and 2009 demonstrate that firms experience on the aver-
age increase in profitability and investment in the first year following the fund activism.
However, in the second year of activism, we observe significant fall in dividend yield and
investment.
The study contributes to the existing literature on several fronts. It primarily ad-
dresses the fundamental question of the impact of hedge fund’s activism on the target
firm’s performance and attempts to explore whether activism strategies as well as their
effect changes following the financial crisis of 2007–2008. There has been a growing
literature on the fund activism in the recent decades, including Brav et al. (2008); Clif-
ford (2008); Klein and Zur (2006); Becht et al. (2010); Boyson and Mooradian (2011);
Bebchuk et al. (2014), evaluating the impact of activist’s proactive role in targets’ short–
term and long–term performance. However, these studies examine merely pre-crisis pe-
riod (except (Bebchuk et al., 2014)), when markets were normal, and fund activism was
widely appreciated. Since the recent financial crisis might have changed the traditional
approach to activism, it would be persuading to reexamine the patterns of targeting
the firms and analyzing the cross-sectional distribution of returns to different types of
activism.
Prior studies on fund activism generally characterize a firm selection as a random
procedure (Brav et al., 2008). The empirical research, however, rather suggests that tar-
geted firms are typically financially and operationally strong with excess cash. Hence,
critics raise a fundamental question on targets post-activism performance, and argue
that target’s better performance be arguably subject to fund good stock picking rather
than fund activism. Contrary to this view, this study counterintuitively argues that
firms are targeted nonrandomly based on certain observable features, thus, highlights
the inherent issue of selection bias. Previously documented studies have deliberately
overlooked it. Our analysis of firms’ characteristics in the year before activism evidently
supports this argument suggesting that activists’ target firms are small-sized, cash-rich,
profitable and highly paying out compared to their matching firms. Thus, to mitigate
the potential issue of endogeneity occurring because of possible sample selection bias, we
use propensity score methodology. Using matching approach, we compare each target
with controlling firm and estimate the probability of being selected for activism.
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In addition, activism-related studies have been analyzing a limited sample period.
Brav et al. (2008) consider five-year sample from 2001 to 2006, and Klein and Zur
(2006) use sample from 2003 to 2005. Contrary to them, however, Boyson and Moora-
dian (2011) analyze relatively a longer data set covering a period of twelve years between
1994 to 2006. In a recent study, Bebchuk et al. (2014) use a sample starting from 1994 to
2007, adding some observations from the crisis period, to analyze the long-term impact
of fund-activism. It is important to note that hedge fund industry has witnessed a surge
in the early 2000s, and in particular in the post-crisis period, allowing a broader frame
to obtain insights. Leading in this aspect, this study considers relatively a longer panel
from January 2000 to December 2013. A large sample frame permits to analyze two im-
portant elements: first, to examine the strategic patterns of targeting, which might have
evolved over the activism period, particularly following the crisis, and second, a compar-
ative analysis in pre– and post-crisis period with well-diversified additional observations.
In evaluating the target firms’ performance, prior literature commonly reports the cri-
teria of industry classification, size, and book-to-market value. The documented studies
have benefited from Fama-French sorted portfolios based on two-digit SIC codes, 5 x
5 size, and book-to-market value (Klein and Zur, 2006; Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and
Mooradian, 2011). In an exceptional case, Klein and Zur (2006), alternatively, use a
sample comprised of firms targeted for activism by non-hedge funds. We share a com-
mon feature with previous studies and use two-digit SIC codes, Fama-French 25 size,
and book-to-market portfolios to evaluate the short-run performance of returns. How-
ever, in addition to Fama-French sorted portfolios as a matching criterion, we adopt a
distinctive approach. We extract firms from Schedule 13G filed by the similar set of
hedge funds to use as a matched sample. It primarily allows us to gain insights into the
activist’s strategic choice of targeting a firm, and predictable potential about the future
outcomes associated with the activism. Moreover, the differential effect in the market
reaction explains the trajectory how the market perceives the presence of activist in an
active target vis--vis passive target.
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following way: Section 2 discusses the formation
of the sample. In section 3 presents the summary statistics on fund tactics and the
targets’ characteristics. Section 4 presents the analysis of the short-run returns around
13D filing in the overall sample in general and compares it with crisis period. Section
5 analyzes the long-term performance of targets for full sample period and relates it to
prior documented studies. Section 6 examines the impact of the recent financial crisis
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on accounting performance of target firms in the long term. Section 7 using different
specifications analyzes the sensitivity of the results, and section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Data collection and variable construction
2.1 Hedge fund sample
Primarily, a sample of 200 hedge funds is obtained upon request from Barclayhedge.com
(private) database with assets under management (AUM-hereafter) and net monthly re-
turns. Of this, funds functioning only in the U.S. are chosen. At next stage, the funds in-
vesting in equities under various categories including global macro, global, event-driven,
market-driven among others are shortlisted. To this sample, we add more funds found
in hedge fund literature and on related websites. A list of at least 500 randomly chosen
funds is assembled. To this extent, the details about fund holdings (AUM) and acquired
stakes in firms are unknown. To make it further diversified and well-balanced sample,
we perform a search test in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR search
file with the first name of the fund in our list and retrieve additional funds. This process
helps in to add more funds to the list which precisely marks about 800 activist hedge
funds. From these 800 funds, we drop a large number of funds functioning as arbitrageurs
or taking positions for short period trading purposes. The process of scrutiny leaves our
initial activist sample to 127 funds involved in activism. To avoid any possible selection
bias, we choose funds regardless of their characteristics e.g. fund size (AUM), previous
filing record, performance, and characteristics of fund managers.
At next stage, each fund is searched in EDGAR system for its record from January
2000 to December 2013. Funds usually report several mandatory files during the period,
they operate. When a hedge fund acquires 5% or more ownership stake in a publicly
listed firm showing intent to intervene in the business course of a firm, it is officially
required to report the 13D Schedule within ten days to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC henceforth) of the U.S. under the ’Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3
3The Schedule 13G is a mandatory disclosure statement for the persons subject to Section 13(g). The
qualified institutional investor is required to meet two core elements. First, the institution must have
acquired the ownership stake in an ordinary course of business and not with the purpose of influencing
the control of issuing authority. Second, the issuing authority must belong to a specific regulatory
institution e.g. bank, insurance firms, saving association under Federal Act, registered investment bank
among others. The filer (qualified institutional investor) of 13G Filing is required to report within 45
days of the end of calendar year in which the beneficial owner holds more than 5% or within ten days of
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The Schedule 13D indicates the filer as an activist and provides the details about filer’s
name, the issuer name and identity as an asset class (bank, money manager), the number
of total shares outstanding, and form (ordinary vs. preferred stock), payment methods
and related costs, the purpose of transaction, filer holdings in total outstanding shares,
and other necessary documentation in the course of transaction’s proceedings.4
The Schedule 13D discloses essential information about filer’s identity. Item 2 enti-
tled as ”Identity and Background” describes the reporting person’s business address and
type, record about filer’s, if any, criminal and civil proceedings in last five years. How-
ever, it does not mention clearly the filer’s type whether it is hedge fund or non-hedge
fund. Thus, to clarify any doubts about fund’s identification and position, we examine
thoroughly each fund’s personal webpage and verify it with Factiva and other related
websites. During this systematic search process, some funds are found offering services
simultaneously for hedge funds as well as for private equity funds. We trace the parent
investment companies which manage these funds and check for their identification. If
the filer is found non-hedge fund, we simply exclude it. To give an example from the
list of activist funds, Deephaven Capital Management LLC, which manages hedge funds
and invests in fixed income securities and in private equity funds. To make sure whether
it is an activist hedge fund, we check its website and record on past transactions in SEC
to confirm its identification.
Using EDGAR’s system to retrieve 13D filings could bias the sample toward big funds
and small firms. In an attempt to acquire a meaningful stake in a firm to employ ac-
tivism, a fund is required to invest a substantial part of holding capital. However, some
activist funds have involved in target firms with ownership stake less than 5%, thus do
not appear in EDGAR’s system. For example, in a recent period, Sandell Asset Man-
agement after acquiring merely 2% stake in JDS Uniphase Corp. (operating in networks
and optical products), urged the target to consider a proposal of divesting some sub-
sidiary assets. Following this suggestion, JDS announced its plan by stating ”This is a
strategy our board has been actively considering for some time, ...” The effectiveness
of proposal in a short period is manifested by fund’s reputation and its active role in
another firm namely Bob Evan Farms Inc., where it acquired four board seats and urged
the firm to spin–off particular assets.5 These events account for a significant portion
the end of the calendar year in which filer holds more than 10% ownership stake.
4Schedule 13D and other filings can easily be downloaded through EDGAR filings search on
[1]www.sec.gov.
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[1]http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/10/activist-sandell-urged-jds-to-explore op-
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of the fund-activism. We gather information about such events using various sources
including financial press and related websites.6
Activist funds file initial Schedule 13D and then report frequently changes to it which
are known as amended file (13D/A). In some cases, these amended files are not reported
after the first announcement to the EDGAR’s system. The amended files exhibit the
developments on fund activism during a specific period. In addition, these amended files
signal the period, the fund stays in the firm (in the later part of analysis, these amended
files are well explained). A notable example is Del Mar Asset Management, LP when it
acquired 4.38% stake in Kennedy-Wilson Holdings, Inc. and announced 13D Filing on
November 16, 2009. However, EDGAR’s system does not report amendments following
the initial filing. Thus, all such cases are not considered.
A structurally well-defined procedure of multiple cross-checking and scrutinization
leaves the sample with 112 U.S. hedge funds demonstrating the average characteristics
of the industry. In comparison with seminal study by Brav et al. (2008) who analyze
236 activist hedge funds over the period of 2001 to 2006, this study investigates 13D
Disclosuers filed by 112 activist funds for a wide period starting from January 2000 to
December 2013. Our sample composition in terms of activists’ distribution resembles to
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) study who investigate 111 activist hedge funds owned by
89 hedge fund management firms over the period of 1994 to 2005.7 Table ?? presents
the distribution of the activist funds over the period of 2000–2013. An overview of the
sample depicts the monotonic trend. The number of activist funds on average do not
vary from 2002 to 2005, however, just before crisis and in following years, an increasing
trend is observed. Table 3 provides details about activist funds and their targets. Out
of 760 fund and firm pairs (repeated in some cases), we have 688 firms uniquely targeted
by 112 funds. On average, each activist fund targets six firms over the sample period.
tions/?KEYWORDS=hedge+fund+2+equity+stake.
6 Important criticism is drawn on activist’s successful campaign by seeking insights to know how
activists systematically gain board seats or influence firm to implement their suggested plan by holding
even less than 5% ownership stake. To gain insights into this puzzle, activists normally propose their
agenda to inclined but reluctant large shareholders including pension funds, mutual funds, private equity
funds, and more possibly with other hedge funds with whom they can find common grounds. Activists
lead the campaign on behalf of other institutional shareholders by dividing the monitoring cost propor-
tionately. [1]http://business.financialpost.com/2014/11/15/how-activist-hedge-funds-on-steroids-have-become-
a-boardroom-enemy/
7How well our sample is diversified and representative of the industry? According to global re-
search firm Preqin [1]https://www.preqin.com/, currently more than 400 activist hedge funds function-
ing worldwide. Of these 400 active funds, 60% are US based thus comprising 240 funds from which we
assemble our sample with 112 activist funds (47%).
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However, some funds exceptionally (e.g. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund, Carl
Icahn C, Jana Partners LLC, and VP Partners LLC, among others) engage in, on aver-
age, more than 20 firms in sample period which demonstrate their wide activist role.
2.2 Target firms sample
For a comprehensive list of 760 Schedule 13D events with the announcement dates, we
retrieve 688 firms which are uniquely targeted by 112 activist hedge funds over the pe-
riod of January 2000 to December 2013. For about 9% cases (760–688), some firms are
repeatedly targeted in similar months, therefore, to avoid repetition in analyses, we drop
the firm occurring twice. However, we strictly consider the purpose of a transaction for
which a firm is targeted. At next stage, these firms are searched into the Thomson
Reuters Datastream for their DS Mnemonic Codes (identification codes). During the
search process, about 20% firms do not appear in Datastream. Thus, we drop them from
our sample. Our well-defined search process shortlists 551 U.S. firms, finally. These firms
are publicly traded at NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
For a sample of 551 target firms, we extract data on their stock prices and for account-
ing figures from their balance sheets, income and cash flow statements, respectively.
Stock prices are daily based and start prior to January 2000 to December 2013. Table
?? provides in details the definition of variables used in the analysis.
Of these 551 firms, a large number of target firms (about 36%) are reported as either
dead or completely buyout, merged, or delisted from Datastream during activism. Given
that, the database does not explain any reason for disappearing firms. The missing an-
nual accounting figures account for approximately 20% of entire sample. However, these
caveats have been noticed by previous studies. Among others, Greenwood and Schor
(2009) reduce their sample size approximately half to the firms available in Compustat
but find it upward biased to small firms.
During the course of activism, a hedge fund keeps on following with the target firm
and files several amendments known as 13D/As. These amended files reveal the fund’s
consideration about the target contemporary performance and its strategic plans re-
garding future policies. In the majority of these cases, a fund demands merely a formal
communication for investment purpose, however, sometimes, it recommends an entire
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change in the course of actions including displacement of CEO, board management,
making or blocking new mergers and acquisitions (M&As), corporate and governance
matters. In order not to miss any important information, I go through these amended
files in particular and gather all theoretical information on relevant items. In case of a
significant change to the previously submitted purpose of the transaction (e.g., if a fund
initially purchases the stock for portfolio investment by having no intention of playing
an active role at managerial level and later on alters it by participating in corporate ac-
tivities as an aggressive/hostile investor) then this amended file would be considered as
a separate case. However, earlier studies report that these follow-up events do not affect
the significance of the overall results (see, e.g., (Greenwood and Schor, 2009)). In this
sample, 3500 amended files out of total 4260 (6 amendments per initial announcement)
constitute about 80% of the total sample.
2.3 Matching firms sample
As discussed in the section 2.1 that when an investor or activist acquires 5% or more
ownership stake and explicitly reveals interest not to influence the control of firm, then
it is mandatory for the acquirer to report Schedule 13G within 45 days at the end of
calendar year in which the investor holds ownership. In the case of holding 10% or more
stake, the duration to file 13G Announcement restricts to 10 days at the end of calen-
dar year. We experience that an activist also acquires a firm for a longer period with
nonactive purpose by filing 13G to the SEC. This intuitively motivates to a comparative
analysis and raise the question to investigate whether firms actively-targeted perform
better than non-actively targeted firms. In other words, to evaluate the performance of
firms reported in 13D Schedules, we use the firms reported in 13G Announcements. We
gather all reported 13G disclosures for the similar set of hedge funds for which we collect
13D files over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. From these 13G Files, we
gather all relevant information including firm name, the percentage of holding to total
ownership, and type of shares (common versus preferred stock). Unlike 13D Schedule,
13G Announcement is distinctively exempted from several clauses to report.8
Initially, we collect 955 firms from 112 hedge funds who report 13G Announcements
over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. At next stage, we search these
firms in Thomson Reuters Datastream database to retrieve their DS Mnemonic Codes
8In some cases, funds initially report 13D Schedule to the SEC, however later on they are observed
to change the status to 13G depending on investment strategy.
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(Identification codes) to collect data. For a small number of firms, which constitute
approximately 6% of the entire sample, however, we do not find codes, thuse these firms
are dropped from our sample. For the rest of 898 firms, we extract data on daily and
monthly stock prices and annual accounting figures from using Datastream. All match-
ing firms are US-based and listed at NY SE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
2.4 Crisis definition
For the analyses of daily and monthly stock returns, we divide the data into two sub-
groups, for the period before crisis, it starts from January 2000 to July 2007, and for the
period during and after crisis, it begins from July 2007 and lasts until December 2013.
For the annual accounting analyses, the observations for the crisis begin from 2007 and
onward.9
In order to evaluate stock returns, the crisis is measured by means of a dummy vari-
able which takes value one, if Schedule 13D is filed from July 2007 and ends at 2013.
In similar fashion, for accounting analyses, crisis is equal to one, if Schedule 13D is re-
ported in the year 2007 and onward. Prior studies considering recent crisis impact have
been using a similar definition (For detail, e.g., see, Maier et al. (2011); Ben-David et al.
(2012); Becht et al. (2010)). In the sample, one-third observations fall in the period
following the financial crisis.
2.5 Event definition
We define an event in our analysis as when an activist hedge fund acquires 5% or more
ownership stake in a publicly listed firm with an intention to influence firm’s internal
governance by a well-stated plan of objectives. On crossing the threshold of 5%, the
fund is required to report a mandatory file known as 13D Schedule to the SEC of the US
within 10 days. We gather dates on these reported announcements by two ways; first,
9The crisis in the sub-prime sector which started in early 2007 subsequently trickled down to the
financial institutions including banks, holding companies, investment banks, and brokerage houses in
the mid of 2007. A general concensus among academicians define the recent financial crisis period
from July 2007 till December 2009. Maier et al. (2011) explain the definition of crisis by stating
”at the end of June 2007, hedge funds of the investment bank Bear Stearns, which had invested
overwhelmingly in the sub-prime mortgage market, were among the first to struggle.” (see, for de-
tails, ’Bear Stearns says battered hedge funds are worth little’, New York Times, July 18, 2007.,
[1]http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/business/18bond.html? r=0.
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the day when a fund acquires ownership and does not disclose to the SEC (its initial
holdings), in case of unavailability of first reported date, we consider the date available
with the SEC.10
3 Summary statistics of activism–based events
3.1 Hedge fund intention towards target
Table ?? exhibits the distribution of hedge funds over the period of 2000–2013. Interest-
ingly, the number of funds does not vary significantly though relatively a small degree
of spike is observed in the closing years of financial crisis.
Table ?? delineates the chronological distribution of the events over the sample pe-
riod. Each event represents a Schedule 13D filing whether it is several times filed by an
individual fund or separately filed by different funds. An overview of the figures reveals
that there is a steady growth in activism events prior to the on-setting of the financial
crisis. The overwhelming majority of the events take place during early 2000 and before
financial crisis which is consistent with pre–crisis events’ distribution documented by
Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Boyson and Mooradian (2011). A potential factor
for the significant increase in activist events is well motivated by Greenwood and Schor
(2009) by arguing that hedge funds might have replaced the role of pension and mutual
funds once occupied in the 90s and early 2000s. Another reason could be the expansion
of the hedge fund industry in post-2000s when the investment was comparatively better
rewarded by fund–related activism. A notable downfall in the events following the crisis
is attributed to the outflow of capital from hedge fund industry and prudent behaviour
of the investor (for detail, see, (Bolliger et al., 2011).
In Schedule 13D form, a filer provides detailed information about the transaction.
Item 5 titled ”Interest in the Securities of Issuer” discloses information about benefi-
ciary entity individually as well in a group, date of the transaction, number of stocks
held by each beneficiary, if it applies then share class (type A or B). Item 3 ”Source and
Amount of Funds or other Consideration” describes the information about the amount
10In section 2.2, we describe in detail the procedure of gathering information on announcement dates.
Since our analysis is sensitive (particularly in short-run) to the fund announcement, thus we are preferably
focused on exact dates when a fund acquires stake. To do so, we match dates reported on the SEC website
with the ones available in the financial press about fund’s transaction. In case, a date is found in press
reported earlier and mismatched with SEC; we replace it with officially reported date.
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paid for purchasing the stock and sources of payment.
Table 6 summarizes the percentage of the shares held by an activist and the related
cost incurred for its purchase. Out of 760 fund-firm pairs, for 733 events (more than
96%) we have details about stocks held by an activist. Mean ownership holding at initial
filing is 13% which is in line with Boyson and Mooradian (2011) reported figure. How-
ever, quantitatively (in dollar terms) it is many times larger than theirs indicating that
targets in our sample are much bigger in size. Regarding the fund’s cost of purchasing
stocks, the available information is limited to about 50% firms approximately. The mean
cost of the transaction for the threshold of 5% or above is about 77 million dollars.
The Schedule 13D essentially provides the details about filer and target firm. Among
others, the Item 4 entitled as ”Purpose of Transaction,” in which an acquirer explicitly
discloses the objective of acquiring the stake. These stated objectives declare the intent
of filer about target firm whether the firm has undervalued stock or requires to be en-
gaged with management regarding business. Table 7 reports the theoretical information
gathered from Item 4. To sort out the information, we follow partly the patterns built
by Brav et al. (2008) into seven different categories as general undervaluation or maxi-
mization of the shareholder value, capital structure, business strategy, sale of the firm,
governance matters, financial distress, bankruptcy, and arbitrage.
Consistent with prior studies (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011) on fund-activism, an
overwhelming majority of cases in our sample demonstrate that activist fund target
firm for a value-maximizing purpose. In two-third cases, funds identified their target as
underperforming compared to its peers which contain potential to increase its market
value if appropriate measures are being taken. We also notice that a fund whether it
files Schedule 13D or 13G always starts participating in the target firm by engaging with
management with a central goal of value maximization.
A considerable majority of the cases exhibits that activists view the target current
business strategy flawed and operationally inefficient, illustrated by an approximately
16 percent of the transaction purposes. A business course might involve restructuring,
spinning off some noncore assets, blocking mergers and acquisitions or negotiating for
better terms of a deal and alike. A reasonable proportion of events (11%) demonstrates
that funds are concerned over poor corporate governance in target companies. Acquiring
a meaningful stake (5% or more) in the target firm empowers the activist to get represen-
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tation on the board and to influence the managerial decisions. Prior studies ((Brav et al.,
2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011) provide a fair amount
of anecdotal evidence from industry. The aggregate of all events classified in table 7
exceeds the total reported events is because of non-mutually exclusively stated goals of
the funds. Activists normally suggest multiple changes in targets simultaneously, for
instance, an activist can involve in ousting CEO along with spinning off some auxiliary
asset. Thus, in such cases, each statement is placed in a different type of activism.
3.2 Hedge fund techniques to influence the target
In this section, we collect and compile the information about fund techniques by which
it intends to influence the targets at the initial level of activism. We order these tac-
tics, according to the course of actions. The tactics are 1): The hedge fund conducts
preliminary meetings on a regular basis with the target’s management to get involved
with the ongoing business activities. About half of the cases reveal that funds begin
actively by negotiating with the management (53.6%). 2): A considerable majority of
funds seeks to get board representation (12.25%). 3): A small number of funds plan to
appoint board nominees (2.24%). 4): The funds intend to prevent the target to make
any unfavorable decision regarding shares repurchase at a discount (2.24%). 5): Hedge
funds ask the target to change the course of business on the proposal of shareholders
(8.56%). 6): Funds performing individually, if unsuccessful, then seek the collaboration
with other institutions or blockholders (5.40%). 7): Fund threats, confronts, or compels
to restructure the target’s regular course of business (9.09%). 8): Fund individually or
in a group, plan to have a proxy contest against target’s merger or acquisition for better
negotiation (4.08%). 9): Fund legally sues the company in bankruptcy court (2.24%).
10): Fund completely buys out the firm or merge it with another target firm (1.58%).
3.3 Characteristics of target firms
Prior literature on fund-related activism argues that fewer regulatory bindings, acquiring
a concentrated stake, and using complicated nexus of investment strategies allows a fund
to assert its influence in mitigating the agency issues associated with managerial discre-
tion (Bratton, 2006; Kahan and Rock, 2007). To do so, what kind of firms, activists
target? The activist funds preferably target companies having prospects in terms of
returns and financial performance. Also, a target selection is subject to a fund’s prede-
termined period of holding a stake in a target, lock-up period, fund and firm operational
and financial characteristics. In this section, we investigate the fundamental question of
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interest, what kind of firms do hedge funds target for activism?
Following prior activism-related literature (Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and Mooradian,
2011), we adopt two distinctive approaches to evaluate the characteristics of target firms
and compare with a sample of matching firms in the year before activism. First, we
compare the target firms with their peers based on size, book-to-market value, and in-
dustry classification. Initially, we sort out all target and non-target firms on 2-digit SIC
industry codes. The non-target firms, which do not match with target firms on 2–digit
industry codes are dropped from the sample. For each target firm, at least one matching
firm is found. At next stage, we choose the non-target firms whose market value of
equity fall between 70% to 130% of market-value of the target firm a month before being
included in the sample. All target and non-target firms with missing observations are
dropped. Finally, we compare the non-target firms with book-to-market closest to the
book-to-market value of event-firms. A continuous procedure of matching and scrutiniz-
ing reduces the sample considerably (by 52%).
Table 9 exhibits the summary statistics of the characteristics of the target compa-
nies in the year before activism. We report mean, median, and standard deviation of
both target and matching sample firms. To mitigate any non-normality which may arise
because of an outlier in variables, we follow the prior fund-related literature (Boyson
and Mooradian, 2011) and winsorize all variables at the threshold of 1%. The last two
columns report the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference in the medians between
targets and matching sample firms. All figures are annual and retrieved from using
Datastream. We compute the essential list of ratios including proxies for firm size, op-
erating, financial performance, debt capacities, profitability, investment, and valuation.11
To demonstrate the significance of average differences in the characteristics of the tar-
get and matching sample firms, we report the difference in medians. Brav et al. (2008)
motivate the use of median difference by arguing that Wilcoxon sign-rank test exhibits
asymptotically normal distribution and provides better statistic in situations when vari-
ables largely display fat tails in their distributions. Column 8 reports the p-values for
the difference in medians.
Starting with the firm size, proxied by market capitalization, the median difference
between the target and matching sample is approximately negative 13 million dollars,
11For the definitions and computation of ratios, table 2 is provided.
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which is insignificant and in line with previous studies reporting hedge fund’s target
being small-sized. To look into the details, we gather qualitative information from 13D
Filings (section 5 & 6), on firm transaction size and total outstanding shares. On average
(median), a fund holds 46.1 (9) million shares in a firm, which constitutes a mean (me-
dian) percentage of 13.3 (7.75%). The incurred cost of these transactions is on average
(median) 77.7 (16.1) million dollars. Thus, this information provides enough evidence
to the typical notion of a fund acquiring a substantial stake in the target by spending
a significant amount of its portfolio capital. However, it is also consistent with the idea
that hedge funds normally do not target big firms, for which they need to spend a large
part of their capital. Brav et al. (2008) argue that acquiring a significant size in a large
firm may induce the idiosyncratic portfolio risk for the fund.
Regarding firm valuation measured by Tobin’s Q (long-term debt + the market value
of equity/ long term debt + the book value of equity) is significantly higher than the
matching sample firm by 0.78 points at 1%. In an unreported result, the book-to-market
ratio (book value of equity/ market value of equity) is positive and exceeds the match-
ing firm by 0.02 points and significant at 5%. These values clearly demonstrate that
undervalued stock is more prone to fund activism. Evidently, about 60% of funds stated
explicitly in Schedule 13D ’Purpose of Transaction’ that the targets are undervalued.
Related to firms’ operational performance scaled at sales growth, return on assets, and
profitability is strongly consistent with the previously documented figures. Discussing
return on assets, which is much higher for the target (0.029) as compared to matching
firm (-0.010) and differentiate from zero significantly. To obtain more evidence from
other measures, we examine the (sales) growth in target firms. Surprisingly, the target
firms outperform the matching firm by 0.03 points which is significant too at 5%. These
results are in contrast with Brav et al. (2008); Boyson and Mooradian (2011), who docu-
ment negatively significant difference in medians. Return on assets and growth coupled
with profitability might explain the entire pre-activism targets performance. To assess
the ex-ante target’s profitability (measured as net income / net sales or revenues), we
find that difference in medians is approximately 0.03 points which is marginally different
from zero. In a nutshell, targets’ operational performance portrays them attractive for
fund activism.
In terms of debt capacities, the book leverage of target (matching) (defined as debt /
(debt + book value of equity)), leverage (total debts / total equity), and market leverage
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(expressed as debt / debt plus + market value of equity) are 0.29 (0.77), 0.27 (0.16), and
0.19 (0.06) respectively and distinguishable from zero at 1%, 10% and 1% respectively.
Except for book leverage, all other measures exhibit higher ratios than matching firms,
consistent with the increasing trend in firms’ leverage in the post-crisis period.12 To
look into the details, one can isolate the firms targeted in post-crisis period to examine
whether the higher leverage is driven primarily by firms in ex-post crisis. These figures
differ from Boyson and Mooradian (2011) reported numbers who find targets with lower
leverage ratios compared to their peers using data from the pre - crisis period. We
may attribute the difference to crisis effect. Some variation in leverage difference can be
explained by Fed’s new policy of quantitative easing, which led to an upsurge in firms
increased borrowings. Summarizing the firms’ debt burden, the targets are relatively
leveraged firms.
To examine whether the target firms are capital intensive and technology-centered, we
assess their investment aspects. Capital expenditure (measured as a percentage of total
assets) and research and development (R&D, measured as a percentage of total assets)
are 0.01 (0.01) and 0.02 (0.01) respectively. Unlike Brav et al. (2008), the firms in our
sample spend relatively more than their matching firms in industry. To explore further
the sources of deriving higher capital spendings, we look into the industry classification
and find that 40% of the sample is comprised of firms belonging to the manufacturing
sector.
Activist funds pay particular attention to target firms’ provision of liquidity and dis-
tribution policy. Target payout policy and excessive cash holding likely increases the
probability of being targeted by the fund. One of the major reason among stated objec-
tives of the fund is to distribute the excess cash in a firm. By doing so, fund achieves two
goals; first, to mitigate any agency issue associated with excess cash hoarding, second,
to increase the payout for its shareholders. In our analysis, the median value (0.08) for
cash (percentage of assets) in target firms is lower and significantly different than the
median value (0.21) of matching firms, implying the low level of cash in targets. These
findings are in contrast with previously documented studies (Boyson and Mooradian,
2011), who find matching firms, on average, hoard more cash than targets. Related to
cash distribution in terms of payout policy, the median observations for both samples
are zero. However, alternatively, we compute the test in a difference in averages. The
dividend yield for target firms significantly differs from matching firms at 1%.
12See e.g. R. Vincent. Leverage ratio surges at large companies. CFO.com, April 10, 2013.
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To examine the impact of the crisis on the activist’s behavior of targeting pattern,
we analyze the characteristics of firms targeted in the year 2007 and onward. Table 11
presents summary statistics including mean, median, and standard deviation for targets
and matching firms for five years from 2007 to 2013. In comparison with the table 9
which provides summary results for the entire period, some results are interesting.
A significant trend which evidently emerges from the crisis period is, that activists
less likely target highly leveraged firms. Our three measures of debt capacities, book
leverage, leverage, and market leverage are no more significant (except ML which is
marginally significant at 10%) in comparison with results exhibited in table 9 for the
full sample period.
Summarizing the characteristics of the target companies by a set of conventionally
defined ratios, we demonstrate in our sample, that the activists target relatively small-
sized, undervalued and financially profitable firms. Our findings also hold with the prior
documented studies which find that target firms are usually highly leveraged, investment
oriented with good distribution policy.
3.4 Likelihood of fund–activism
3.4.1 Sample selection bias
In section 3.3, the characteristics of target firms are compared with those of matching
sample firms to examine the targets’ performance in the year prior to fund activism.
By analyzing the target’s features, we attempt to show whether differential effects be-
tween a target and a nontarget might explain some potential reasons for a firm to be
targeted for activism. However, critics raise fundamental question on fund choice and
argue that an activist likely targets a firm which is financially strong, well-performing
and has potential to reflect its intrinsic value if firm’s fundamentals are aligned. Thus,
target’s outperformance in post-activism period remains controversial and not credited
to the fund activism rather subjects to the activist good choice.13 It raises an underlying
issue of sample selection bias primarily occurring because of nonrandomness of targeting
patterns and selection on observable covariates. Prior literature in fund activism has
13To counter the argument of fund cherry-picking stock; we thoroughly examine the fund suggested
measures and subsequent actions in targets to see the real impacts of fund activism on firm’s performance.
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paid relatively less attention to this potential issue.14 Apparently, it appears due to
the choice-based sampling, in which an activist fund chooses a potential target and not
because the analyst (see, e.g., Heckman (1979)).15
Given the nonrandom selectivity, the probability of being selected for fund activism
could be discussed using propensity score approach which has gained considerable at-
tention in recent decades (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); Heckman and Navarro-Lozano
(2004); Heckman and Vytlacil (2007); Coffee and Palia (2014)). Heckman and Todd
(2009) propose for propensity score methodology in a setting (experimental studies)
where members of the treatment group are over or under-represented about their fre-
quency in the population. As discussed in section 2.1 that our analysis includes likely
those cases in which an activist files Schedule 13D (acquires ≥ 5%) and ignores all
such potential cases, where activism takes place with less than 5%, thus considers the
treatment group under–representing the total population and fits to the setting to use
propensity score methodology.16
In this section, we use propensity score approach to a setting where we conjecture
that firms are targeted on some observable characteristics for activism. Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983); Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) propose matching sample strategy to
encounter confoundedness.17 It primarily allows to obtain the uniform distributions of
target firms with matching sample firms, and thus helps yield possible unbiased esti-
mates. We begin to construct a vector of common characteristics in which we match
14Recently in a critical study on fund activism, Coffee and Palia (2014) highlighted this issue by raising
serious concerns over formation of matching sample in evaluating activist performance.
15Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) model this issue as an economic choice by considering two
potential outcomes (Y0, Y1). δ =1 if Y1 is selected and δ = 0 if Y0 is selected. Activists pick their
respective outcome based on utility maximization (which would be treatment effect in the case of choosing
good target firms). Let V be utility which is formulated as:
V = µV (Z,UV ) D = 1(V > 0)
Where Z is a vector of factors (observed by the analyst), UV are the unobserved (by the analyst) factors
and determine choices, and 1 is an indicator function. Our emphasis is on two different information sets
— information set which an activist has and basis on certain observables— information set which an
analyst has and is restrained with information about activist’s choices.
Another reason for not likely considering the issue of selection bias in previous fund-related studies could
be that researchers manually construct sample and thus presumably avoid any non-random sampling
errors (see, e.g., the seminal study of Brav et al. (2008)).
16In later analysis, we introduce model to examine the causal effects of fund activism on target firms.
17In popular term, this strategy is known as nearest neighbour (NN) matching, based on treatment
probabilities. The attractive feature for which Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008); Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009) argue is that it initially helps reduce bias rather than variance in estimates.
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the targets with controlling firms to assess the probability of a firm to be a potential
target. Prior literature on propensity score matching suggests using all concerned vari-
ables which may affect both treatment selection and the outcome (Austin et al., 2007).
Thus, we include all possible characteristics which might explain the probability of a firm
selection. At next stage, using a logit regression model upon multivariates in lagged pe-
riod, we examine the probability of each covariate in explaining the variation in firm
selection.18 In addition, we show too whether our results show persistency with those
obtained from nonparametric analysis in section 3.3.
Table 10 exhibits the effects of covariates on the likelihood of fund activism. We com-
pare the sample of target 551 firms with nontarget 898 firms based on propensity score
matching.19 Using a logit regression setting, the dependent variable being dummy set
to 1, if a firm is targeted in the year before activism. The independent variables include
a vector of firm salient features. The results are presented. To control for fixed effects,
we include industry and year dummies. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Table 10 reports the coefficients of the multivariate regression model results. We
discuss some interesting results. The market capitalization (in natural logarithm) is dis-
tinguishable from zero and provides some explanation for the variation in fund decision
whether to target the firm for activism. In table 9, a fund choice of targeting firm for
activism has also been discussed using a non-parametric test. Fund essentially takes into
account the size of a firm and uses the mode of activism which might affect the firm
governance in the immediate future.
Firm valuation parameter, Tobin’s Q, is consistent with the result presented in section
3.3 and is in line with prior documented findings (e.g., (Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and
Mooradian, 2011)). The coefficient on Tobin’s Q is negatively significant at the level of
5%. We interpret it as one standard deviation decrease in Tobin’s Q is associated with
0.55 percentage points increase in the probability of a firm being targeted by an activist.
18In principle, any discrete model can be used to estimate the propensity score. The preference for
logit or probit models is highly derived from the unlikeliness of the functional form when the response
variable is highly skewed and predictions are outside the [0, 1] bounds of probabilities (e.g., see, Smith
(1997). For binary treatment cases, where we estimate the probability of target vs. nontarget — logit or
probit models yield almost similar results, however, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue for logit model
since it demonstrates more density mass in the bounds.
19Alternatively, we can match each target firm with nontarget based on market value, book-to-market
ratio, and 2–digit SIC codes.
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Regarding firms’ debt capacities, the coefficient on book leverage explains the cross-
sectional variation in fund’s objectives when targeting a firm. For instance, one standard
deviation increase in book leverage increases the probability of a firm being targeted with
0.58 points, if other things remain the same. This leaves enough potential for activists
to target highly leveraged firms to generate value through restructuring their debts.
The patterns emerging from logit regression are consistent with the non-parametric
analysis in section 3.3, and suggest that activists in general target small-sized, under-
valued and highly leveraged firms to create value for its shareholders.20
3.5 Changes in targeting patterns during and after the crisis
Following the crisis, we seek whether there is any observable change in the targeting
patterns of fund-activism. We go through the Schedule 13D filings mainly Item 4 to
obtain information about the activist purpose of the transaction. In addition, we follow
the reported development in the financial press. We emphasize on two aspects; first,
following the crisis, what are those potential venues which an activist identifies for value
generation? Second, given the restrained circumstances for liquidity, how does an ac-
tivist manage its finances for activism?21
To examine changes in targeting patterns, we examine the event data by generating a
dummy variable for the crisis, which takes a value 1 if a particular type of activism oc-
curs during the period, starting from July 2007 to December 2013. In table 7, the event
summary is decomposed for the periods before and after the crisis into two separate pan-
els. A comparative overview of panel B and panel C depicts an even distribution of the
events. To test whether a specific type of activism is exercised relatively more following
the crisis, we carry out the nonparametric analysis by using Wilcoxon sign rank test for
the statistical significance for a difference in medians in pre– and post-crisis period.
To begin with target’s capital structure, we test whether the crisis has affected the
activists’ approach in targeting firm to intervene in capital structure; we find that the
20In an auxiliary tabulated result, we find that average probability of a firm being selected for fund
activism is approximately 30%.
21Since the financial crisis, a paradigm shift has been experienced in fund activism. There are certain
components which are relatively more exposed to activists, for example, lack of leverage, M&As, gov-
ernance issues. On the other hand, funds are also facing a shortage of liquidity to acquire a significant
stake in firms for a long period.
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median difference between events in crisis period marginally differs than the events be-
fore the crisis. For post-crisis Schedule 13D reported events, which account for 38% of
the entire sample period, of them 40% cases of capital structure come from post-crisis
period. This figure is economically justifiable. Since the financial crisis, the target firms
experienced high leverage and constraints in financing their business, thus appeared as a
potential target for activism. In addition, we also find a significant change in patterns for
the activists targeting firms’ internal governance during the crisis. Ousting CEOs, board
reshuﬄing, and aligning performance-based compensation were norms of the financial
crisis. For the activists, who do not intend to intervene in targets at managerial level
proactively, are found distinguishably different than the pre-crisis period at 1% level.
The activists intervening in targets to reform their businesses including operational ef-
ficiency, to make better deals in M&As show no significant difference even during the
crisis.
Next, we discuss the firms’ characteristics targeted during and after the financial crisis
in the year before activism. Table 11 provides the results obtained from the nonpara-
metric analysis for the firms targeted during the period from 2007 to 2013. We report
mean, median, and standard deviation of both target and matching firms. The last two
columns report the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference in the medians between
the targets and matching firms. All figures are annual and retrieved from Datastream.
The table presents proxies for firm size, operating and financial performance, debt ca-
pacities, profitability, investment, and valuation.22
The target firms appear small-sized (market-cap) in the year before activism during
the crisis. The difference in medians between target and nontarget is negative 3.71 mil-
lion dollars, which is distinguishable from zero at 5% level of statistical significance.
Regarding valuation, the difference in medians for Tobin’s Q is positive, 0.85 points and
significant at 1%, indicating that following the financial crisis, activists targeted valued
stock. Looking at operational performance measured by net sales and sales growth, we
find that nontarget firms are outperformed by target firms during and post crisis period.
The median difference in net sales is approximately 163 million dollars, significant at
5%. During this period, targets’ sales growth positively increased by 4%, however, the
difference is not statistically significant. In addition, target firms reduced excess cash
by 7% as compared to nontarget firms in the year before activism. We also find that
during this period, target firms highly paid their investors by increasing dividend yield.
22Variables are well-defined in table 2
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Thus, the reduction in cash could be used to pay dividends. Target firms are relatively
more leveraged in the year before activism as shown by market leverage ratio which is
marginally significant at 10%.
To measure the conditional probability of each covariate in the firm selection, we com-
pute the propensity score for each firm characteristic using logit p-score model within
a year. To do so, we primarily begin our both samples for targets and nontargets from
the year 2007 to 2013. Then we extract observations for firm accounting measures in
lagged year before fund activism. To facilitate our matching procedure, we also include
2-digit SIC codes and year. In order to mitigate any possibility of outliers, we winsorize
variables at 1% level. Of 551 target firms from 2000 to 2013, approximately half of the
firms (263) fall during crisis period from 2007 to 2013. On the contrary, in nontarget
firms sample, roughly about 61% firms (545) constitute the crisis period. Thus, we find
at a minimum, one matching firm for each target firm.
Table 12 presents estimates on targeted firms’ characteristics in comparison with non-
target firms using propensity score matching during the crisis period. An overview of the
results depicts that using propensity score; we possibly obtain closed matches between
two samples as shown by the differences between treated and control. However, using
score matching to reduce selection bias and differences may not hold for some charac-
teristics, for instance, the difference between treated and control for ROA and R&D is
exceptionally large enough to influence the treatment probability. To test the hypothesis
whether target firms during the crisis do not differ (in characteristics) from matching
sample firms, we use t-statistics using the pstest procedure in an untabulated result and
find that target firms during crisis significantly differ from matching firms. Moreover,
we also find that the average probability or propensity score for a firm to be a potential
target for fund activism based on characteristics is 32%. We also observe that by ex-
cluding cash variable for which we have fewer observations in the sample, this increases
to 38%. In addition, the number of exact matches also varies due to the covariates used
to measure the propensity score.
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4 Fund activism and stock returns performance
4.1 Short–run announcement returns for targets
To measure the immediate reaction of the market to the activist’s announcement, we em-
ploy the ”event-study” approach. Numerous studies have implemented this methodology
to examine the effect of corporate events on a firm’s stock price around the announce-
ment days empirically. A well-developed literature begins as early as Dolley (1933) study
of examining the effect of stock split in nominal price. In the late 1960s, the seminal
studies by Ball and Brown (1968), and Fama et al. (1969) introduce improvements, which
provide the foundation for today’s methodology.
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) investigate the issues related to the violation of sta-
tistical properties in event studies methodologies. A key issue with daily stock returns
is non-normality as identified by Fama (1976), and as a consequence, the distribution
of daily stock returns tends to fat-tailed as compared to a normal distribution. Brown
and Warner (1985) find similar evidence in excess returns by examining the properties
of a small sample. To this specific problem, Billingsley (1979) proposes Central Limit
Theorem and argues that if the cross-sectional excess returns in securities are drawn
from independent and identically distributed samples from finite variance distributions,
then the distribution of mean excess returns converges to normality as the size of the
sample increases. The fact that non-normality does exist in event studies, our sample
size is large enough to rule out such problem.
Prior studies in fund-activism have been using event study approach to examine the
effect of fund announcement on the target firm’s stock price around 13D notification
dates (for details, see, (Klein and Zur, 2006; Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and Mooradian,
2011)).23
To compute the abnormal returns around the announcement days, Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model is preferred over the returns computed from passively targeted
matching firms. Two important reasons are argued; first, by matching on these three
attributes, we control for systematic risk associated with stock returns and financial
characteristics related to firm-type (see, e.g., Klein and Zur (2006)). Second, this ap-
23In recent periods, the application of event study approach could be seen in various fields of Economics
and Finance; In Financial Economics (Brav and Gompers (1997)), Accounting performance (Bhagat et al.
(2001)), and Finance and Law (Bhagat and Romano (2002)).
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proach provides a comparative analysis of our results with prior fund activism-related
studies, which use equally– or value-weighted market index or portfolios to compute
abnormal returns.
The use of the event study approach in fund activism is critically viewed as it contrasts
with the essence of methodology, which necessarily requires the event to be unpredictable
by the market. In other words, the critics argue that fund’s announcement in target firm
is a likely event, which is perceived well in advance prior to the disclosure of notification
date. Thus, this approach subjects to misspecification. In counter-narrative, we argue
that our suggested relatively longer estimation window should induce all such informa-
tion and as a result, the market reaction to the event date should be neutral. However,
we show that before the fund announcement, the market behaves normally and reacts to
the fund notification overwhelmingly.24 In addition, it is the activist, who evaluates the
target and declares the intent to intervene in firm’s ordinary course of business which is
entirely independent of market assessment. Thus, the market is most likely unaware of
the fund’s announcement and unanticipated course of action.
In order to prevent the event being influenced by the normal performance, we con-
struct an estimation window of 120 days, suggested by MacKinlay (1997). For each
target firm, we extract daily stock price 150 days prior to the event date and restrict it
to 30 days before the given filing or announcement date. An estimation window of four
months or (–150, –30) 120 days will likely account for any nonlinearity in time-series
patterns of stock returns.25
Building on the methodologies proposed by MacKinlay (1997); Greenwood and Schor
(2009), we construct the initial setting as:
ARiτ = R
Target
iτ −RMatchτ (1)
Where RTargetiτ is (logarithmic) normal return on the target firm security and R
Match
τ is
the (logarithmic) return on the matching portfolio security. To compute abnormal return
for each target firm, we use Fama and French (1993) well-constructed six valued–weighted
24In later analysis, we show the patterns in market behavior by constructing multiple event-windows
to demonstrate that as soon as the market perceives the information content, it begins to discount all
factors associated with the event and reflects in firm’s stock price around the announcement days.
25In our sample, a small number of target firms (approximately 6%) do not provide an array of stock
prices for 150 days before the event date for certain reasons. For such insignificant cases, we generate
surrogate observations by taking the average of closest period values.
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portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market value. Fama and French (1993) three-
factors include High minus Low (HML), Small minus Big (SMB), and market return
factor.26 We subtract each announcement observation in excess of the aforementioned
factors to compute abnormal returns. Then these abnormal returns are aggregated
through multiple time dimensions:
CARτ1,τ2i =
τ2∑
τ=τ1
ARiτ (2)
In the next stage, we test the hypothesis whether mean cumulative abnormal returns
are different from zero or alternatively fund announcement has no effect on target firm
stock price. To test whether these abnormal returns are statistically significant, we use
standard Z-test.
To examine the market reaction to fund’s involvement around the announcement days,
we construct multiple event-windows of different sizes. Figure 1 plots mean CARs for
targets over the longest event-window of (–20, +5) or 26 days covering pre– and post-
announcement dates. The evolving pattern in returns reveals no significant movements
in the early days, but as soon as market perceives the fund presence, a positive and
significant response emerges from the market. Being well-informed and highly liquid,
the US stock market immediately responses to fund’s transaction and reflects it in the
stock price. An equally important question arises to what degree market reacts to this
transaction or how much CARs in aggregate are fully realized. We witness a price run-
up which keeps on rising sharply and as a result, there is a realization of more than
5% CARs for event window of (-20, +5) days. Figure 2 and figure 3 decompose the
total CARs in pre– and post–crisis period to know which part of observations is mainly
deriving positive returns. A depiction of figure 2 clearly demonstrates that pre–crisis
fund announcements are well-rewarded by market long before the fund notification by
generating about 7% CARs. However, on the contrary, in the post–crisis period, only
positive CARs are realized merely one day before the fund notification and hardly marks
3%. These results are in line with Becht et al. (2010), who find a sharp fall in CARs
approximately by half (10.5% - 5.8%) over the period from 2006 to 2010. They argue,
the potential collapse of the takeover markets and liquidity, for the significant shortfall
in abnormal returns during the crisis period.
26Portfolios formed on size and book-to-market can easily be downloaded from [1]Fama-French web-
site.[http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html]
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There is a general consensus over the positive response of the market to fund’s an-
nouncement. The short-run performance is consistent with prior research on fund ac-
tivism. As Brav et al. (2008) document an aggregate of 7.2% buy-and-hold returns
(BHARs) in excess of buy–and–hold returns on the value-weighted NYSE/ AMEX/
NASDAQ index over an event-window of (–20, +20) 41 days. Using a long panel of
firms over the period of 1994 to 2005, Boyson and Mooradian (2011) report 9% to 11%
for filing and event date respectively. In a recent study, Becht et al. (2010) analyze the
market response to fund disclosure and report that for a relatively longer event window
of 41 days, about 6.9% abnormal returns are generated. In contrast with the positive
response, an early study by Klein and Zur (2006) documents some mixed findings. Their
reported figures suggest an array of different ranges of CARs from 5.0% to 10.3% over
multiple period event-windows when abnormal returns are computed using the market
index. However, when event firms are matched on industry/size/book-to-market, the
size-adjusted mean returns are negatively significant.
To identify the early –10 days [–20, –10] effect, we break-up the event window to [–10,
+5] days to capture the close impact of 13D filing on stock prices. Interestingly, there is
no significant change to CARs. This finding suggests that the market has realized the
intent of fund acquiring the firm. Thus, the information has been potentially discounted
long before the fund formal notification about activism. Table ?? illustrates the various
event windows and their subsequent CARs. While analyzing the aggregate returns for
each window, it seems that a significant portion of returns accrues just before the event
or announcement date. The run-up spike follows early days, which is depicted by (–10,
+5) event window. A drastic change is observed in trading volume in (-10, +5) day
event window generating 5.14% CARs in excess of the market returns, demonstrating
an immediate outcome of acquiring a substantial stake in the target. However, post-
announcement day scenario differs. We observe that the CARs reduce approximately
by half in (0, +10) event window, which indicates that market has exhausted all avail-
able information about volume of transaction and activist declared purpose of targeting
firm.
4.2 Types of activism and event–days abnormal returns
In previous analyses, enough light has been shed on how activist discloses the objective
of the transaction in a Schedule 13D filing. These stated objectives are classified broadly
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into two types, active versus nonactive. Activists identify potential venues for improve-
ment in target firm’s value and specify a plan of action. We gather the qualitative
information from 13D Filings Section 4 ”Purpose of Transaction” about the fund’s type
of action and classify them into five widely well-defined categories partly following Brav
et al. (2008). In this section, we examine the heterogeneity in market perceptions about
fund’s particular type of activism and investigate that which type of activism generates
more returns for the fund by constructing univariate settings:
CARsi = αi + βiTypei + i (3)
Where CARsi present abnormal returns for firm i in aggregate manners obtained from
multiple event windows, and the only explanatory variable Typei indicates the well-
defined type of activism based on fund initially stated objective. Table 14 explains the
cross-sectional distribution of expected CARs accruing to various types of activism.
In table 14, column I to IV illustrate the regression results after regressing CARs
of multiple event-windows against the types of activism. Following the prior literature
(Boyson and Mooradian, 2011), the estimated coefficients would be interpreted as the
market reaction to each type of activism explicitly stated in fund’s purpose of the trans-
action. In order to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity in returns over time,
we control for the target firm size, year and industry dummies. The long-term debt is
expressed as the ratio of long-term debt to the aggregate of total debt and market value
of equity. The model includes dummies for General Undervaluation, Capital Structure,
Business Strategy, Sale of Target, Governance. We winsorize firm size and long-term
debt at 1% level.
Since the model mostly incorporates dummies, to facilitate the interpretation of the
coefficients on dummy variables, we follow the practice of suppressing the intercept of
the regressions as suggested in the previous fund-related literature (see, e.g., Brav et al.
(2008); Boyson and Mooradian (2011)). In addition, the nondummy variables, which
include the size of the target and long-term debt are demeaned and expressed in the
form of deviation. As a result, the coefficients on dummies can be interpreted as the
average effect of a specific group of type of activism on abnormal returns assuming that
the targets demonstrate average characteristics.
Table 14 presents the effects of covariates on CARs of different event windows around
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the announcement of Schedule 13D. In column I, CARs from longest (–20, +5) event
window are regressed against the activism dummies, firm size, and the long-term debt.
The estimates of all dummies are positive which indicates the proportionate contribution
of each type of activism in generating the mean abnormal returns. The fund proposing
to change the capital structure in the target is successful in generating highest mean
CARs of 12.2 percentage which is positively significant at 5% level. The returns to the
capital structure activism are likely justified in the wake of the recent crisis in which most
of the targets were financially depressed because of imbalances in the capital structure.
Following returns to capital structure, activists announcing changes to target business
strategy likewise restructuring or spinning off are generating a mean CARs of 9.2%,
which distinguishes from zero at 5% significance level. Activists with no pre-specifying
purpose of the transaction are rewarded the least with a mean CARs of 2.8% which
is marginally significant in the longest (–20, +5) event window. We critically observe
another pattern in returns arising from general undervaluation category, which shows
that as the news of fund’s notification approaches to the date of the announcement, the
returns eventually increase.
Given the non-mutually exclusive nature of the types of activism, an activist can
generate aggregate abnormal returns by getting involved in different kinds of activism
simultaneously. A fund, for instance, may suggest its initial objective to alter the capital
structure, but later on, it may propose measures to the firm’s business strategy. Thus,
the overall effect could cause to generate aggregate abnormal returns of 21.4% (12.2%
+ 9.2%). However, if these changes are proposed at the beginning of the first filing, it
is less likely to identify the source to which market reacts most. In table 14 column II,
CARs from a relatively shorter (-10, +5) event window are regressed on the set of simi-
lar explanatory variables. As a result, the magnitudes of estimates reduce considerably,
nonetheless remain persistently significant. We explain this differential effect in returns
arising from intervals in event-windows as a market mechanism of discounting informa-
tion well before a fund formal announcement. Column III and IV explain it further by
extending days in the post-announcement period and show how the coefficients on types
of activism become gradually marginally significant. Summarizing the cross-section dis-
tribution of abnormal returns, we observe that the market reacts remarkably to the
foreseen changes in firms’ capital structure and business-related activities and reflects
an immediate positive response in stock prices. On the other hand, market persistently
generates abnormal returns to the announcement of funds who merely engage with the
firm’s management on the regular basis and do no specify a particular course of action.
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These results are in line with the previously reported studies on the activism impact
on returns. Brav et al. (2008) find that market reacts most, and generates positively
significant abnormal returns of 8.54%, to the announcement of fund stating its goal to
spin off a certain segment of the firm and followed by the fund with intent to engage
with management without any intervention. Using relatively a longer panel, Boyson and
Mooradian (2011) document, that the fund putting up its stated agenda as to intervene
in target’s governance is highly rewarded by price appreciation with a significant CARs
of 38.5%. The remaining activism-motives other than governance, though generate pos-
itive abnormal returns, but are not distinguishable from zero.27
In summarizing, we may conclude that in short–run market responses to the fund’s an-
nouncement and generates positive abnormal returns. We also find that market perceives
each type of activism distinctly different by discounting the information it receives and
reflects in target stock price. The question of generating high abnormal returns subjects
to level and degree of activism. In general, the findings in this study are consistent with
the previous studies on the aspect of positive abnormal returns in short-run. However,
the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns is attributed to differently composed
datasets and approaches to detect them. In addition, prior studies examining the market
reaction to fund activism have been using pre-crisis period, a distinguishable factor to
be taken into account.
4.3 Crisis effect
4.3.1 Abnormal returns around the announcement days in post financial
crisis
To examine the crisis impact on fund activism, we revisit the model used in section 4.2
and incorporate the crisis dummy in it. In addition, we include non-dummies specifica-
tions, including the size of the firm and long-term debt. Both variables are demeaned
and presented in deviation form. We regress dependent variable CARs on multiple event
windows against dummies of activism, crisis dummy, and size of the firm. We control
for industry and year fixed effects in all panels. To observe the mean effect of each type
of activism, we suppress the intercept term.
27Klein and Zur (2006) report BHARs returns for activism types, but in a slightly different way,
which are significantly positive.
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Table 15 reports the regression results after incorporating the crisis dummy. The co-
efficient on the crisis dummy is positively significant. Unlike results reported in table
14, the coefficients on stated objectives appear with mixed results (both positive and
negative). However, quite surprisingly, none of the estimates is statistically significant
across the event windows of multiple lengths. Our interest, however, lies in the central
variable, i.e., crisis, which is positive and in part explains variation in abnormal returns.
The market response to the activist’s announcement, regardless of any specific objective,
is illustrated by figure 3. It indicates the real effect by reflecting the downfall in returns
during the crisis period around the announcement dates.
In the next stage, we ask whether size of the target firm explains variation in the
cross-section of abnormal returns during the crisis period. In addition, we also create
interactive terms of crisis with types of activism to analyze the effectiveness of each type
during the crisis period. In general, each coefficient on the interaction term would be
interpreted as the mean effect of the crisis on each type of activism. In later analysis,
we argue for the composition of these variables.
Table 16 revisits the previous model with interaction terms and reports the results
for multiple event windows. The activist funds, proposing structural improvements in
target’s business, earn most of abnormal returns in longest (–20, +5) event window.
This result is consistent with Becht et al. (2010) findings, who report that during crisis
takeovers, mergers and acquisitions appeared to be a potential source of generating value.
The abnormal returns from business-related activism are competitively followed by those
funds who put forward their agenda to intervene in financially depressed firms.28 During
the recent crisis, default of firm or fund appeared as norm and forced either voluntarily
or involuntarily to be sued in courts. Given such circumstances, if fund appeared to
assist and reorganize target’s business and reduce debts, then such involvement is highly
appreciated from the market. However, approximately 10% CARs are realized merely
marginally at 10% level. In relatively shorter (-10, +5) event window, coefficient on
General Undervaluation becomes significant, which indicates that market is more re-
sponsive to the funds aquiring firms without any pre-specifying agenda. Funds without
any specified stated goal earn more than 8% in excess of matching sample firms. This
contrasts with results presented in table 14, which reports that funds serving no active
28Chapter 11 is a legal process which allows both coordiantors including firm and fund to reorganize
the target business and pay the debts over time.
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role are rewarded by 3.9% immediately in the short period. Interestingly, the net gain
to nonactive role increases during the crisis.
By comparing the results obtained in table 16 and table 14, we observe two distinct
emerging trends. First, since the financial crisis, it is more popular to invest in a fi-
nancially depressed firm. Firms which experienced inadequate liquidity and operating
capital to run the business are largely affected by the crisis. Activists viewed such firms
potential venue which could be exploited to generate returns by appearing as collabora-
tive force. For example, when Brookfield Retail Holdings LLC acquired General Growth
Properties, Inc., it clearly stated that firm has bankrupted, and requires re-organization.
Firms which require more liquid assets and capital to run the business are mostly
affected by the crisis. To improve their business direction, activists find potential to
provide liquidity to restructure non-functional segments and assist firm to get on track.
Contrary to this finding, we find that it is more profitable to restructure firms debts
as seen in full sample period. Table 14 exhibits the highest cross-sectional returns are
attributed to fund whose stated goal is to reform capital structure.
Second, regardless the crisis effect, a bulk of abnormal returns is driven by business-
related activism. In full sample period, it generates more than 9% returns, which in-
creases by 4.2 percentage points when we control for crisis effect. It indicates that
business related activities which involve restructuring, bargaining for better terms in
mergers and acquisitions, and focusing on growth opportunities, are more profitable
across any economic situation.
Table 17 presents results for the model using full specifications of crisis and interaction
terms. We regress CARs obtained from three different event-windows across types of ac-
tivism and crisis interaction terms with and without industry fixed effects. From column
(1) to (9), we find that estimates for types of activism become insignificantly negative in
the period before crisis across multiple event-windows. For the firms targeted without
any pre-specified stated objective, however, the effect is significantly negative without
incorporating year dummies. These results are contrary to the post-crisis period. The
coefficients on crisis interaction terms are insignificantly positive in models when crisis
dummy is used. We drop the crisis variable, highly correlated with interactive terms,
and gain results which are significantly positive. Results from various models suggest
that market highly appreciates the fund announcement with stated objective of influ-
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encing target’s business strategy, which is persistently pronounced without year effect.
Following it, funds without the pre-specifying objective of influencing firms are highly
rewarded with approximately 10% CARs.
These findings initially suggest that positively significant abnormal returns are pri-
marily driven by post-crisis period despite the economic downturn and heavy losses in
stock markets.
5 Activism and long–term performance
5.1 Model, notations, and analysis
The long–term impact of fund activism on target firm’s performance has been assessed
using several methodologies.29 In section 10 we initially established in our discussion that
an activist targets a firm based on certain observables. Thus, our analysis is bounded
under the assumption of unconfoundedness in which we observe some factors related to
both the dependent variable and with error term (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Given
this particular setting, we identify propensity score, which allows us to assess the condi-
tional probability of a firm being selected for activism.
In this section and in what follows, we analyze the impact of fund activism on tar-
get firms in a succeeding year using propensity score matching. Initially, the standard
formation of unit-level causal effect is modeled partly following Roy–Rubin model (Roy,
1951; Rubin, 1974) as:30
τi = Yit1 − Yit0 (4)
Where Yit1 is a potential outcome for firm i after receiving treatment in post-activism
year 1, and Yit0 is a counterfactual outcome for firm i before receiving treatment in
29Ideally, a standard Difference − in − Difference approach is considered a suitable mechanism
to estimate the average effects in a setting where the firms are targeted randomly on unobservable
characteristics (Blundell and Dias, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In the simplest setting, the
average gain over time in the control group is subtracted from the gain over time in the target group.
Thus, in doing so, differencing helps mitigate biases in the second period on both dimensions timewise
as well as cross-sectional.
30 Roy – Robin model with trivial notations has been adopted in the evaluation literature (see, Heck-
man and Navarro-Lozano (2004)). In this study, the generic functional form of treatment effect is
presented in similar fashion.
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pre-activism year 0. The potential outcome is defined as Yi(Di) for each firm i, where
i = 1, 2..., N and N represents the total population. However, we observe only one
outcome for each firm i, i.e., the counterfactual outcome which is unobserved during the
analysis and leading to the problem of misevaluation. To resolve this issue, Caliendo
and Kopeinig (2008) suggest to concentrate on the average treatment effect rather than
individual treatment effect τi.
To assess the average effects of activism for a well–constructed sample, representing the
entire population, generally two eminent estimators are used namely average treatment
effect (ATE), and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT or ATET). Since we are
interested in those firms which are selected on certain observables and exposed to fund
activism — in addition, the targeted firms are matched with another control group which
is less likely prone to activism— thus, ATT is a more relevant expression to estimate
the activism impact. 31 The average treatment on the treated is parameterized as:
τATT = E(τ | D = 1) = E[Y1 | D = 1]− E[Y0 | D = 1] (5)
However, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that counterfactual mean for the firms
being targeted – E[Y0 | D = 1] is not observed, so we need a proper substitute for it to
estimate ATT. The true parameter τATT is only identified, if:
E[Y0 | D = 1]− E[Y0 | D = 0] (6)
5.1.1 Long–term performance using propensity score matching approach
In this section, we examine the target firms performance using propensity score match-
ing approach based on the assumption that the firms are targeted on observables.
In table 18, we regress the change in firm characteristic as a dependent variable against
”Activism Dummy” with using a vector of control specifications. The coefficient on ac-
tivism dummy which indicates average treatment effect after being targeted and would
be interpreted as activism impact on firm’s accounting performance. To control for fixed
effects, we include firm size both in linear and quadratic form, industry, and year dum-
mies. We include the observations for which we find close match in controlling sample
31Drawing samples (target and nontarget) from similar sample of activists funds (representing sub-
population) also raise serious concerns over selection — a problem of endogeneity, which will be discussed
in following analysis.
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firms based on propensity score.
Table 18 presents some interesting results. The coefficient on net change in cash is
negatively significant at 1% level. Which initially implies that target firms substantially
reduced the excess cash as compared to the year before fund activism and thus, reduced
the chances of being exposed to agency issues related to holding excess cash. In addition,
one-year long-term accounting performance exhibits that firms experienced overwhelm-
ingly increased investment and improved profitability as indicated by the change in
capital expenditure and profit margin variables.
In comparison with results presented in table 18 in time-series setting, we are keenly
interested in long-term performance compared to matching firms. Table 19 presents the
results in excess of matching sample firms one year following the activism. In doing so,
we revisit the previous setting and substract the matching firm characteristic from tar-
get firm. The net change in firm characteristic is regressed against Activism Dummy,
and vector of control specifications. Since for each characteristic variable, the number
of matches differ between target and nontarget firms, thus each regression experiences
different number of observations.
While discussing the results, we find that the coefficient on activism dummy is sig-
nificant for various dependent variables (change in firm characteristics). Target firms
substantially improve the market value compared to matching sample firms in post-
activism one year, however, only marginally significant at 10% level. Valuation, the
book-to-market value is positively significant. Moreover, the targets profitability is also
positively significant at 5% level. While comparing with matching firms’ debt capac-
ity in the post-activism period, target firms experience a moderate reduction in market
leverage by 0.39 percentage points, which is however marginally significant.
Summarizing the results obtained from using the propensity score approach, we show
that target firms experience improvement in various components which include valua-
tion, profitability and investment both in time-series and cross-sectional analyses. These
significant improvements are initially attributed to activists suggested measures in tar-
get firms.
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5.1.2 Long–term performance using difference-in-difference approach
In section 5.1.1, we primarily assume that firms are targeted based on observable char-
acteristics. Thus, there is a potential issue of bias sample selection. To resolve it, we
evaluate the target firms’ performance for full period of analysis using propensity score
matching approach. In contrast with propensity score methodology, we use a stan-
dard difference-in-difference approach by relaxing the assumption that firms are selected
nonrandomly. We assume that counterfactual levels for target and nontarget firms are
different but time invariably remains the same and thus formulate it as:
E[Y0t1 − Y0t0 | D = 1]− E[Y0t1 − Y0t0 | D = 0] (7)
Following prior documented studies on hedge fund activism (Klein and Zur, 2006;
Brav et al., 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Bebchuk
et al., 2014), we extend the empirical evidence and test the hypothesis whether hedge
fund activism actually improves the targets’ performance in the long-term.
To evaluate the long-term performance of targets, we analyze the firms characteristics
in one-year following the activism and compare them with matching sample firms. By
doing so, our analysis provides us a comparison on two dimensions; first, we compare the
results of the post-activism year with results obtained in the pre-activism year (time-
series analysis), second, to compare the performance of the matching sample firms in the
year following the activism (cross-sectional analysis). As a result, the improved changes
may be attributed to the suggested measures by activist funds, assuming other factors
remain equal.
To analyze the ex-post performance in target firms in succeeding year following ac-
tivism, we adopt two approaches. In the first approach, we assemble a matching sample
using a benchmark of size/book–to–market value/ 2–digit SIC industry code in the
same year. Then compute the difference in means in pre and post-activism means, and
medians for target and matching sample firms. Then, a test of differences between the
change in medians is used as proposed by Boyson and Mooradian (2011). In the second
approach, using time-series setting, we compare the characteristics of targets in pre and
post-activism and test the difference in medians.
Table 21 presents the characteristics of targets in the year after activism and compares
them with matching firms. For the events taking place in 2013 and onward, Datastream
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is unable to provide data for the next fiscal year. Thus, in such cases, we drop firms
from the sample. In addition to this, many firms in the first year of post-activism are
either delisted, acquired, merged or simply did not produce data.32 All variables are
winsorized at 1%. The entire set of variables are annual and the accounting data is
extracted using Datastream.
In table 21 from column I to columm IV, the change in means and medians in target
and nontargets are reported respectively. Column V and IV exhibit the difference in
change in medians for the target firms and report the Wilcoxon signed-rank test values
to demonstrate the level of significance in the difference in medians.
To assess the long–term impacts of activism on target firms’ performance, we analyze
firm valuation, operational performance, and profitability measures. Brav et al. (2008)
argue that ROA and operating profit margin are reasonable measures which largely re-
main unaffected by nonoperational factors such as leverage and corporate taxes. Starting
with the difference in medians for target firms, Tobin’s Q has reduced only 7% as com-
pare to 80% in matching firms, suggesting that targets have gained much appreciation
in value compared to peers during activism. The net value of Tobin’s Q in excess of
matched sample is 0.73 points which is significantly different from zero at the level of
5%. This finding is strongly supported by the change in book–to–market value. Target
firms improve their book-to-market value by 0.03 in contrast with 4% reduction in non-
targets’ value. The net value of 7% is positively significant at 1%. These results explain
the funds pre-activism intentions about undervalued targets and show how successful
activists are in improving the firms’ value. The reason for which many targets delist
following the activism is largely explained by the fact that they enhance their value, and
thus, are being sold at a premium to the potential acquirer (for details, see, Greenwood
and Schor (2009)).
In analyzing the targets operating profit margin and growth, the findings are inter-
esting. Activists appear successful in sustaining the ex-ante level of profit margin in
the year prior to activism. Looking at the difference in targets profitability in pre– and
32When a fund announces 13D Filing with a pre-specified purpose, it suggests measures and asserts
influence to implement its plan of actions over the course of activism. In some cases, these actions
prolong and outcomes are realized in the later period. To receive all such outcomes, fund keeps on
increasing its ownership and thus fully buyout the target. In this case, target goes private from public
and get delisted. On the other hand, fund forces its portfolio firm A to acquire another portfolio firm B
to get high premium. In these cases, database does not provide data for post-activism period.
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post-period might induce the perception that the target firms marginally sustain the
pre-activism profit margin. However, they have indeed, outperformed the nontargets
matched at the size / book to market / 2 digit SIC industry. Decomposing the ratio
(EBIT / Net Sales) and tracking back to the change in sales, we can clearly see that
difference in sales is not significantly large. Thus, this finding, evidently, supports the
view that activists’ targets perform much better than their peers. To extend the analysis
further, we examine the comparative trends in growth in targets sales. The time-series
patterns emerging from changes in growth reveal that there is a reduction of 2 percent-
age points following the activism. However, targets still lead their peers by 3% which is
positively significant at 5% level.
On the side of investment, the capital expenditures improved substantially following
the activism. On the contrary, the matching firms reduce their spendings on assets
largely. In our study, a considerable portion of companies come from the manufacturing
sector (36% and 33% for targets and nontargets respectively). Thus, the positive change
in capital expenditures has a meaningful implication. A net effect of 4 percentage points
which is positively significant at 5% level is arguably attributed to the impacts of fund
activism.
Summarizing the post-activism accounting and financial performance of the targets,
we may conclude that there is significant evidence that activists facilitate the poorly-
performing firms in improving their long-term value. Using a set of well-defined proxies
for firm’s characteristics, we show that targets outperformed their peers in terms of
value, profitability, and investment. These findings are contrary to one strand of litera-
ture, which documents that fund-related activism presumably extracts short-run returns
on the cost of long-term value destruction. Instead, we find evidence that shareholders
not only benefit in the short-run but also realize value enhancement in the long-term by
the constructive participation of activists.
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6 Long–term performance in crisis period
6.1 Regression analysis
6.1.1 Model, notations, and analysis
In this section, we test two competing hypotheses. In the first hypothesis, we test
whether and how recent financial crisis has affected the long-term performance of target
firms. To examine crisis effect, we divide the sample into two distinct subgroups; in
pre– and post-crisis period. For the pre-crisis period, we include firms targeted between
2000 to 2006. For the post-crisis period, we investigate firms targeted from 2007 to 2013.
Table 22 demonstrate some interesting results for time-series nonparametric analysis.
We compute summary statistics for both samples before and after the crisis period. An
overview of the difference in medians depicts that the crisis has substantially affected
the target firms’ size, profit margin, leverage, distribution, and investment. Firm’s size,
which is measured by various means, including market capitalization, sales, and total
assets is positively significant. It necessarily implies, that size being an important factor,
explains in part variation in the long-term performance.
The recent financial crisis has undoubtedly affected the profitability of target firms.
The difference in medians for profit margin exhibits 4 percentage points, which is nega-
tively significant at 1%. Moreover, profit ratio also reduces by 2% for the firms targeted
during the crisis period. To examine whether crisis brings a meaningful change in firm’s
debt capacity; the book and market leverage values initially suggest that target firms
reduce their leverage during the crisis period. However, the difference in medians is
statistically insignificant. On the contrary, the leverage ratio (measured by total debt to
total assets) indicates that target firms have remarkably increased their leverage follow-
ing the financial crisis. To investigate the underlying factors for driving higher leverage
in firms, we look at investment measures assuming that higher leverage might have used
to initiate new projects. We find that target firms experience an increase in research
and development and capital expenditures by 2.4 percentage points and 2% respectively,
which are positively significant at 1%. Next, we examine whether the crisis has any
impact on firm’s distribution policy. We find that the median observations for dividend
yield, for both samples, are zero before and after the crisis. Alternatively, we test the
difference in means, which is negatively significant at 5%, thus, showing that target firms
reduce paying dividends to shareholders following crisis period
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In table 23, we evaluate the target firms’ performance in excess of matching firms
before and after the crisis period.33 The differences in medians suggest some mixed
findings. Firm size in excess of matching sample firms is larger by 1.4 percentage points
which is significant at 5% level. We experience positive effect for size when measured by
net revenues and assets, however, statistically insignificant.
In terms of valuation, targets outperform the nontargets in post-crisis period which
is significant at 1% level. In addition, target firms find a remarkable increase in invest-
ment measured by capital expenditures in the post-crisis period. However, following the
crisis, targets experience higher leverage which is strongly evidenced by the positively
significant difference in medians for book leverage and leverage ratio. We also find that
targets profit margin reduces in the post-crisis period, which is marginally significant at
10%. In comparison with results in table 21, the findings in this analysis partly share
some commonalities. For instance, the target firms experience improvement in valuation,
investment, and distribution.
To test our second hypothesis, we examine the performance of a similar set of firms,
which are targeted in the pre-crisis period and remain in funds’ control in next two years
following the crisis. We evaluate these firms’ performance in two years before and after
the crisis. By doing so, we expect the ’change in performance’ may allow us to attribute
it to the fund activism in excess of matching firms during the crisis period. Initially, we
have a setting, where target and nontarget firms expose to an exogenous shock, i.e., cri-
sis, and we address the fundamental question whether target companies perform better
than matching peers during the crisis period. Instead of evaluating firm’s character-
istics (the proxy for firm performance) before and after the activism, we evaluate the
change in characteristics before and after the activism in pre– and post-crisis period. To
simplify our analysis, we relax the assumption of targets being selected on observables.34
33The change in firm’s characteristic is computed for both target and nontarget, before and after the
crisis period. To simplify it by an example, we assume the change in market capitalization, i.e., MV:
∆Characteristic = MV t2007−13 −MV t2000−06 −MV m2007−13 −MV m2000−06 (8)
Where MV t2007−13 is the average market value of target firms sample during 2007 to 2013, MV
t
2000−06
is the average market value of target firms sample during 2000 to 2006, MV m2007−13 is the average market
value of matching firms sample during 2007 to 2013, MV m2000−06 is the average market value of matching
firms during 2000 to 2006.
34A similar question has been partly discussed in Bebchuk et al. (2014) work. They use pre–crisis
data to examine the impact of crisis on target’s profit margin and valuation measures, however, in their
setting — the sample selection is considered randomly.
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Our difference-in-difference setting initially parameterizes the crisis effect in a simple
regression model as:
∆Characteristicsit = αi + βiPresence+ γiDummyi + θiControli + εi (9)
Where ∆Characteristics is the change in a specific characteristic before and after the
crisis period in excess of matching sample firm. The explanatory variable Dummy takes
a value of 1, if a firm is targeted during that year (during the period when we analyze
the change in characteristic) by any other activist. Presence is a dummy variable which
is equal to 1, if the activist fund still has controlling rights in the firm in the year after
the crisis. The variable Control is the vector of specifications which control for size,
indebtedness, age, year and industry fixed effects.
Following Bebchuk et al. (2014), we measure the change in firm characteristics for
a subsample of firms targeted in 2006 and 2007 before and after the crisis. Activists
generally do not stay in target for longer period and reduce their ownership on aver-
age after two years. To account for activist presence in target, we have incorporated
dummy namely Presence. We examine change in performance on both dimensions; time
variate (across the years) and as well as cross-sectional (difference with matching firm).
However, there is possibility that the coefficient β on dummy variable can be biased,
particularly when firm characteristic is likely correlated with dummy. To simplify it
with an example, we assume that a firm is targeted whose debt is lower than the match-
ing firm in 2007 and we are interested in to examine the target’s leverage position in
one year post–activism. Now suppose that in year 2008, another activist hedge fund
acquires a meaningful stake (≥ 5%) and suggests some measures which may lead the
target’s leverage either to increase or decrease, thus this may cause the coefficient β to
produce some spurious effect – especially, it may tend to overvalued the performance of
Dummy variable in increasing or decreasing the leverage during the crisis – thus without
taking these considerations into account, we may report biased estimates.
Table 25 presents the estimates on different dummies when change in firm character-
istic (after minus before) is regressed. For each regression, we control for firm size, age,
year and industry fixed effects. As we have relaxed the assumption of biased sample
selection, we compare the target firms with a matching sample firms using a benchmark
of size/book-to-market value and 2-digit SIC industry codes. By matching targets on
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well-defined benchmark reduce our sample drastically. In addition, we are evaluating
firms targeted during 2006 and 2007, therefore, lower number of observations (11%) is
inevitable.
In comparison with Bebchuk et al. (2014) findings, the coefficient on ”Fund Presence”
is negative in the first year, which implies that firm value has reduced significantly in
the first year of activism during the crisis period. In the second year of fund activism,
however, it becomes insignificantly positive. Following the first year of activism, targets
improved in profitability and profit margin (at 5% and 10% respectively) and invest-
ment (indicated by research and development), which is positively significant at 10%.
These results, however, become significantly negative in second year of activism during
the crisis period. We do not find any evidence that presence of another activist fund
(outside sample) affects firm’s performance. These results partly provide evidence that
target firms enhanced their earnings and investment even during the crisis period.
In table 25, we regress the change in firm characteristic (after minus before) in excess
of matching firms against a vector of dummies, and control variables.35 The results ob-
tained in cross-sectional analysis, interestingly do not deviate much from those in table
24. The estimated coefficients on change in profitability and investment are positively
marginally significant. Thus, we may conclude that during crisis firms targeted by ac-
tivists performed relatively well in comparison with their industry peers and we do not
find evidence that targets became more fragile and vulnerable to economic shocks com-
pared to nontargets during crisis period.
7 Robustness check
To examine whether our results for crisis effect and types of activism hold for different
model settings, we consider several robustness checks. First, we investigate whether the
size of the firm is an underlying source of surviving from getting delisted after activism.
35The change in firm characteristics is computed for both target and nontarget before and after the
crisis period in following simplistic setting:
∆Characteristic = MV t2008−09 −MV t2006−07 −MV m2008−09 −MV m2006−07 (10)
Where MV t2008−09 is the average market value for target firms sample during 2008 to 2009, MV
t
2006−07
is the average market value for target firms sample during 2006 and 2007, MV m2008−09 is the average
market value for matching firms sample during 2008 and 2009, MV m2006−07 is the average market value
for matching firms during 2006 and 2007.
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To explain further, a big portion of the targets got delisted following the activism in this
study. Those firms either fully acquired or went private from public, and as a result did
not report annual accounting and stock price data to Datastream. We check whether
firm size plays any role during the crisis. Second, we consider the liquidity of target to
assess whether it explains cross-sectional returns to the firm capital structure. Third,
given that the 13G and 13D Filings are drawn from similar funds, we expect the mar-
ket to react differently (high or low) to those 13D announcements, which were acquired
previously with 13G.
7.1 Size explains the cross-sectional distribution of abnormal returns
Table 26 presents cross-section of CARs for multiple event-windows by introducing
Schedule 13F and six-months pre-activism daily returns to basic model.36 In our sam-
ple, a large number of activist funds hold concentrated ownership in target firms and
have filed Schedule 13F along with 13D. Given that, we are interested in to analyze the
impact of such significant stakeholding on market perception and the subsequent impact
on initial stock price.
An overview of the estimates reveals that the coefficients on types of activism change
across multiple event-windows. In the longest event-window of 26 days, the estimates
on General Undervaluation, Capital Structure, and Business Strategy are positively
significant at 10% and 5% respectively. In comparison with results presented in table
14, the magnitude of coefficients reduces, however, remain statistically significant.37
7.2 Impact of firm size and liquidity on CARs during crisis period
Table 27 presents results regressing CARs obtained from various event-windows against
types of activism and crisis-interaction terms. We examine the market responses to the
activist certain stated objective given the firm size and liquidity during the crisis period.
By introducing firm size and liquidity interactive-terms into our settings, we attempt to
decompose CARs and measure the differential effect in types of activism perceived by
the market. To do so, we construct size (firm) interactive terms with all types of activism
36Institutional investment manager is required to report Schedule 13F to the SEC within 45 days of a
calendar year after having an aggregate market capitalization of at least $100 million.
37In an auxiliary regression, we substitute firm size, market capitalization, with net sales and total
assets to check whether different measures explain the cross-section of abnormal returns.
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during crisis period. In constructing leverage-interaction terms, we argue that activists
suggesting changes to target’s capital structure may involve restructuring of the debts,
in particular, during the crisis period, thus, market perceives such changes positively. To
the funds getting involved with firms being financially depressed also primarily requires
to restructure the debts.
In table 27, using full model specifications and a vector of control variables, we find
that the estimates with interaction terms involving leverage are positively significant
across various event-windows. These findings support the view that market positively
responded to the activist fund’s involvement in a firm capital structure during the crisis
period.
8 Concluding summary
This study examines hedge fund activism impact on target firms’ performance with a
largely hand-collected unique dataset, which consists of 112 activist funds targeting 551
firms over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. An activist hedge fund accu-
mulates 5% or more ownership stake in a firm with an intent to influence firm’s internal
governance by filing a Schedule 13D Form to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.
The study investigates the fundamental question whether the recent financial crisis
has affected the hedge fund activism. Since the crisis, critics have been questioning
the effectiveness of hedge fund monitoring in target firms. Thus, we seek to examine
whether crisis might have changed the traditional approach to activism and introduced
new paradigm shifts, making it interesting to investigate whether and how activists have
shaped the targeting patterns of impacting the firms.
The study thoroughly examines the funds’ objectives, targeting tactics, firms’ re-
sponses, and the evolving outcomes. In comparison with previous studies, it investigates
the emerging trends in strategic ways of impacting firms before and after the crisis. The
study identifies pre-crisis period starting from January 2000 to June 2007 and post-crisis
from July 2007 to December 2013.
The targeted firms in our analysis share features which are partly in line with pre-
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viously documented studies. These sample firms are small and medium-sized with an
undervalued stock, and operationally profitable compared to the matching companies
in the year before activism. A target being a small-cap allows activist hedge funds to
acquire a meaningful stake, suggest measures, assert pressure, and implement their pro-
posed agenda. To pursue their stated objectives, activists tactically interact with firm’s
management. In some cases, the interaction occurs in a friendly way, and on various
occasions, it materializes in hostile manner.
The findings of this study are partly consistent with the prior documented literature
on fund activism. In short-run, the market reacts positively to the hedge fund activism
around the announcement of 13D filings. The longest (–20, +5) event-window generates
a mean CARs about 5.34%, which is in line with reported studies. A large part of the
variation in cross-sectional CARs accrues to the activists targeting firms with an ob-
jective of restructuring the debts followed by business-related activism. Since the crisis,
funds targeting firms to change the business-strategy earn more than 15% returns which
are followed by funds targeting financially depressed firms.
We also test the competitive hypothesis whether abnormal short-run returns are ex-
tracted at the cost of long-term value destruction. The long-term accounting perfor-
mance of the targets, after one year of activism, suggests mixed results. Target firms
substantially find an increase in profitability, investment, and improvement in value.
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Table 1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Market value Total number of outstanding shares times price per share.
Net sales Firm’s annual sales in dollars.
Tobin’s Q Aggregate of long-term debt and the market value of eq-
uity divided by aggregate of long-term debt and the book
value of equity.
Book-to-market
ratio
Firm book value of equity/market value of equity.
Growth in sales Annual percentage growth in sales.
Cash flows Cash as a percentage of total assets.
Book leverage Total debt divided by the aggregate of total debt plus the
book value of total equity.
Market leverage Total debt divided by the aggregate of total debt and
market value of equity.
Cash Aggregate of cash and cash equivalents divided by total
assets.
New equity Amount of new equity issued during the year divided by
the lagged assets.
Dividend yield Aggregate of common dividend and preferred dividend di-
vided by the aggregate of the market value of common
stock and market value of preferred stock.
Payout Total dividend divided by the net income before extraor-
dinary items.
Capital expenses Capital expenses as percentage of total assets.
Research and
development
Research and development as a percentage of total assets.
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity.
Continued on next page...
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... continued
Variable Description
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes divided by net sales.
Liquidity Cash and short-term assets divided by current liabilities.
Growth ratio Retention rate, which is equal to 1 minus dividend de-
clared divided by the net income
Return on equity Net income divided by the total equity.
WACC Weighted average cost of capital, computed as:
E
V
Re +
D
V
Rd(1− Tc)
Re Cost of equity
Rd Cost of debt
E Total common shareholders equity
D Total debt
V Total value is an aggregate of total equity and total debt.
Cost of equity Dividend per share divided by the current market value
of stock multiplied by the growth rate of dividends.
Cost of debt Annual interest payment of total debt divided by market
value.
Industry 2–digit SIC industry codes of each firm
Data
sources:
All ac-
counting
and fi-
nancial
figures are
extracted
from the
annual
reports
of target
firms
using
Datas-
tream.
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Figure 1: CARs (–20, +5)
Cumulative abnormal returns are plotted over the longest event window of (–20, +5) 26 days for a
sample of 551 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. To
compute CARs for each target, we use Fama and French (1993) well–constructed six value–weighted
portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market value. 0 indicates the announcement date when the
activist formally reports a 13D Schedule to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the US within
ten days of acquiring ownership in the firm. We consider 20 days prior to the event date and extend to
5 days after the announcement date.
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Figure 2: Pre–crisis CARs (–20, +5)
We decompose the sample into two subgroups: pre– and post-crisis period. In our study, we define
pre-crisis period employing a dummy which takes the value one if a firm is targeted in the period from
January 2000 to June 2007. Figure 2 plots CARs for the pre-crisis period. Out of total 551 firms, 334
firms or 60% of the sample falls in the pre-crisis period. To compute CARs for each target, we use Fama
and French (1993) well–constructed six value–weighted portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market
value.
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Figure 3: Post–crisis CARs (–20, +5)
Figure 3 exhibits the CARs performance in the post-crisis period. In the sample, we define post-crisis
period from July 2007 to December 2013. 40% of the sample, which constitutes around 220 firms
fall into post-crisis period. To compute CARs for each target, we use Fama and French (1993)
well–constructed six value–weighted portfolios formed on size, and book-to-market value.
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Table 2: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Market value Total number of outstanding shares times price per share.
Net sales Firm’s annual sales in dollars.
Tobin’s Q Aggregate of long-term debt and the market value of eq-
uity divided by aggregate of long-term debt and the book
value of equity.
Book-to-market
ratio
Firm book value of equity/market value of equity.
Growth in sales Annual percentage growth in sales.
Cash flows Cash as a percentage of total assets.
Book leverage Total debt divided by the aggregate of total debt plus the
book value of total equity.
Market leverage Total debt divided by the aggregate of total debt and
market value of equity.
Cash Aggregate of cash and cash equivalents divided by total
assets.
New equity Amount of new equity issued during the year divided by
the lagged assets.
Dividend yield Aggregate of common dividend and preferred dividend di-
vided by the aggregate of the market value of common
stock and market value of preferred stock.
Payout Total dividend divided by the net income before extraor-
dinary items.
Capital expenses Capital expenses as percentage of total assets.
Research and
development
Research and development as a percentage of total assets.
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity.
Continued on next page...
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... continued
Variable Description
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes divided by net sales.
Liquidity Cash and short-term assets divided by current liabilities.
Growth ratio Retention rate, which is equal to 1 minus dividend de-
clared divided by the net income
Return on equity Net income divided by the total equity.
WACC Weighted average cost of capital, computed as:
E
V
Re +
D
V
Rd(1− Tc)
Re Cost of equity
Rd Cost of debt
E Total common shareholders equity
D Total debt
V Total value is an aggregate of total equity and total debt.
Cost of equity Dividend per share divided by the current market value
of stock multiplied by the growth rate of dividends.
Cost of debt Annual interest payment of total debt divided by market
value.
Industry 2–digit SIC industry codes of each firm
Data sources: All accounting and financial figures are extracted from the annual reports of target firms
using Datastream.
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Table 3: Number of hedge funds and their target firms
This table summarizes in detail the total events, and number of firms targeted by activist hedge funds
over the period of 2000 to 2013.
Fund / Firm pair Number
Total fund/firm pairs 760
Individual fund/target firm pair 760
Number of individual targets 688
Number of individual funds 112
Number of hedge fund management companies 86
Number of firms targeted once 398
Number of firms targeted twice 114
Number of firms targeted thrice 27
Number of firms targeted four times 12
Number of activist hedge funds with 1 target 18
Number of activist hedge funds with 2 targets 13
Number of activist hedge funds with 3 targets 11
Number of activist hedge funds with 4 targets 15
Number of activist hedge funds with 5 targets 11
Number of activist hedge funds with 6 targets 13
Number of activist hedge funds with 7 targets 15
Number of activist hedge funds with more than 8 targets 16
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Table 4: Chronological distribution of funds
The table represents the chronological distribution of the activist hedge funds over the
period of January 2000 to December 2013.
Years Number of Funds Percentage of sample
2000 10 8.93%
2001 4 3.57%
2002 7 6.25%
2003 6 5.36%
2004 7 6.25%
2005 7 6.25%
2006 13 11.61%
2007 10 8.93%
2008 9 8.04%
2009 9 8.04%
2010 17 15.18%
2011 6 5.36%
2012 2 1.79%
2013 5 4.46%
Total 112 100.00%
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Table 5: Chronological distribution of target and matching firms
The following table represents the chronological distribution of firms drawn from Schedule 13D Files,
and Schedule 13G Files from EDGAR search system in Securities and Exchange Commission of the US.
These files are reported by a similar set of activist US hedge funds over the period of January 2000 to
December 2013. A 13D Disclosure indicates the intent of an activist to influence the internal governance
of target firm whereas a 13G Disclosure shows a fund has no intention to play an active role. All firms
are publicly traded at NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges.
Year No. of targets % of sample No. of matching % of sample
2000 23 4.24% 12 1.34%
2001 30 5.52% 28 3.12%
2002 33 6.08% 35 3.90%
2003 28 5.16% 78 8.69%
2004 38 7.00% 106 11.80%
2005 68 12.52% 76 8.46%
2006 67 12.34% 148 16.48%
2007 77 14.18% 122 13.59%
2008 55 10.13% 83 9.24%
2009 23 4.24% 55 6.12%
2010 48 8.84% 87 9.69%
2011 32 5.89% 42 4.68%
2012 10 1.84% 9 1.00%
2013 11 2.03% 17 1.89%
Total 543 100% 898 100%
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Table 6: Percentage of ownership held by fund and firm
The table represents the summary statistics of the information gathered from Schedule 13D Filing using several items, in particular, Item 5 known
as ”Interest in the Securities of the Issuer.” This statistics provides averages about 760 events filed by 112 activist hedge funds over the period of
January 2000 to December 2013.
Initial Filing Mean Median Sd. Min Max Obs.
Shares held by hedge fund ($mil.) 46.1 2,600,329 626 147 12200 733
Total outstanding shares by the target 410 28 7930 363 210000 717
Percentage of ownership held by fund 13.13% 7.75% 15.87% 5.71% 100.00% 717
Cost(incl./excl.commission)($mil.) 77.7 16.1 222 7794.2 2310 433
64
Table 7: Categories of activism
This table summarizes the stated objectives and categorizes them into well-defined types of activism
for the 760 events reported over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. The types of activism
are classified partly following the specifications of Brav et al. (2008). Each type of activism is a dummy
which takes value 1 if a specific objective falls in a particular category. The categories are non-mutually
exclusive. Panel A summarizes types for the entire set of events. Panel B presents the summary of
activism types for the pre-crisis period which begins from January 2000 to until June 2007. For one-
third observations which fall in the post-crisis period between July 2007 to December 2013, panel C
illustrates the information on types of activism.
Panel A: Types of activism for entire sample period
No. Category Stated Objective Number of Events % of Total
1 CAT1 General Undervaluation 601 79.3%
2 CAT2 Capital Structure 51 6.7%
3 CAT3 Business Strategy 119 15.7%
4 CAT4 Sale of Target Firm 41 5.4%
5 CAT5 Governance 85 11.2%
6 CAT6 Bankruptcy/ Chapter 11 10 1.3%
7 CAT7 Arbitrage 2 0.3%
Panel B: Types of activism before crisis Jan 2000 - June 2007
No. Category Stated Objective Number of Events % of Total
1 CAT1 General Undervaluation 381 68.16%
2 CAT2 Capital Structure 32 5.72%
3 CAT3 Business Strategy 68 12.16%
4 CAT4 Sale of Target Firm 23 4.11%
5 CAT5 Governance 52 9.30%
6 CAT6 Bankruptcy/ Chapter 11 3 0.54%
7 CAT67 Arbitrage 2 0.3%
Panel C: Types of activism during and after crisis July 2007 - December 2013
No. Category Stated Objective Number of Events % of Total
1 CAT1 General undervaluation 221 63.14%
2 CAT2 Capital Structure 20 5.71%
3 CAT3 Business Strategy 51 14.57%
4 CAT4 Sale of Target Company 18 5.14%
5 CAT5 Governance 33 9.43%
6 CAT6 Bankruptcy/ Chapter 11 7 2.00%
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Table 8: Fund techniques to influence the target
The following table summarizes the qualitative information about an activist fund on how it plans to
carry out agenda of influencing the target firm. Activist describes its reason of targeting firm in Item
4 known as ”Purpose of Transaction,” along with precise plan of action to implement the course of
agenda in target firm. These suggested measures could be of multiple-tasking in nature simultaneously.
We collect this information from 760 Schedule 13D reported to SEC and filed by 112 activist hedge
funds over the period of January 2000 to December 2013.
No Tactics Number of
Events
Percentage
of Events
1 Meeting with the management on preliminary
basis in order to get involve with business
activities / negotiation
408 53.62%
2 Seeking board seat for better representation
of shareholders interest and to maximize the
value through large stake
93 12.25%
3 No more board representation / withdrawal
of board seat
17 2.24%
4 Negotiation over limiting poison pills 7 0.92%
5 Shareholder proposal for business structure
changes
65 8.56%
6 Negotiation with the larger shareholders in
order to change managerial or corporate
policy changes
41 5.40%
7 compel to restructure/working with other
shareholders
69 9.09%
8 Solicitation/ proxy contest for board
replacement or other managerial changes /
preventing from acquiring or merging
31 4.08%
9 Legal Suing /sues in the bankruptcy court to
fulfill the legal requirements
17 2.24%
10 Acquiring of the total firm/ complete buyout
/ merging with other firm
12 1.58%
Total 760 100%
66
Table 9: Target characteristics in year before activism
This table reports the characteristics of target firms for the year before activism and compares it with a matching sample based on size/book-
to-market/2-digit SIC industry. The sample consists of 551 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013. Market Value is
firm stock price times number of shares outstanding and measured in dollars. Sales represent firm annual sales in dollars. Tobin’s Q is defined as
(long-term debt + the market value of equity/ long term debt + the book value of equity). The book-to-market ratio is expressed as the book
value of equity/market value of equity. Sales Growth is annual percentage growth in sales. Book Leverage is defined as debt/(debt + book value
of equity), Leverage is measured as total debts / total equity, Market Leverage is defined as debt/ (debt + market value of equity). Cash as a
percentage of assets is defined (cash + cash equivalents)/assets. Dividend Yield is defined as (common dividend + preferred dividend)/(market
value of common stock + market value of preferred stock). The payout is defined as total dividend / net income before extraordinary items. Capital
Expenses and Research and Development are measured as a percentage of assets. Profitability is operating profit margin and measured as EBIT /
Net sales. The entire set of data is extracted from Thomson Reuters DataStream. We report the mean, median, and standard deviation for both
target and nontarget samples. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians between the target and matching firm, and column VIII reports the
p-value to demonstrate the level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 987.86 257.78 2,257.88 936.22 270.33 2,066.06 -12.55 0.2003
Sales ($mil.) 869.22 279.20 1,568.37 613.68 92.36 1,268.47 186.84 0.0001
Tobin’s Q 2.56 1.55 4.01 2.13 0.77 5.62 0.78 0.0000
Book-to-market -1.10 0.45 21.67 -1.37 0.43 25.85 0.02 0.0385
Growth 1.11 1.04 0.67 1.10 1.02 1.24 0.02 0.0454
ROA -0.04 0.03 0.43 -0.18 -0.01 0.50 0.04 0.0000
Book Leverage 0.46 0.29 1.03 2.13 0.77 5.62 -0.48 0.0000
Leverage 0.83 0.27 4.86 0.41 0.16 2.52 0.11 0.0942
Market Leverage 0.26 0.19 0.27 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.0022
Cash 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.30 0.21 0.29 -0.13 0.0000
Dividend Yield 0.45 0.00 1.35 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.0041
Payout 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.17 0.00 2.01 0.00 0.4575
Capital Exp. 0.13 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.6390
R& D 0.10 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.0403
Profit -2.62 0.04 17.04 -6.32 0.01 32.17 0.03 0.0792
Assets ($mil.) 1,426.21 356.61 4,021.32 919.04 120.43 2,670.10 236.18 0.0000
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 10: Logit regression – Likelihood of fund activism
The table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of being targeted by a hedge fund in the
year before activism. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes a value 1 if a firm had been a
target in the previous year. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Column I reports the
coefficients and column II reports marginal probabilities. All data is extracted from Datastream. We
winsorize all variables at 1%. *, **, *** Indicate the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Characterisitcs Coefficients Marginal Probabilities
Market Capitalization -2.962** -0.414*
-1.439 0.232
Total Sales -0.109 -0.015
(0.151) 0.0206
Growth -0.325 -0.045*
(0.199) 0.027
Return on Assets -0.679* -0.095*
(0.397) 0.057
Tobins Q -0.540** -0.075***
(0.217) 0.023
Book to Market value 0.169 0.024
(0.108) 0.016
Book Leverage 0.575*** 0.080***
(0.221) 0.024
Cash 1.769* 0.247
-1,064 0.154
Dividend Yield -0.795 -0.111
(0.727) 0.089
Research Development -0.000 -1.51e-07
(0.000) 0.000
Capital Expenditures -6.026* -0.842
-3,157 0.531
Constant 1.182** -
(0.572) -
Observations 88
Pseudo R-squared 0.211
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Table 11: Target characteristics in the year before activism - Crisis period 2007 -2013
This table presents the characteristics of firms targeted during 2007 to 2013 in the year prior to activism. We decompose our full sample (2000–
2013) into two parts; before and after the crisis period. For crisis period, we include the years from 2007 to 2013. Target firms’ characteristics are
compared with a matching sample using a benchmark of size, book-to-market value, and 2–digit SIC codes. Table 2 in Appendix provides detailed
definition about the variables. The data on accounting measures is extracted from using Thomson Reuters DataStream. We report summary
statistics including mean, median, and standard deviation for both target and nontarget samples. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians
between the target and matching firm, and column VIII reports the Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-value to demonstrate the level of statistical
significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 961.75 257.78 2527.90 1068.63 261.49 2420.86 -3.71 0.0237
Sales ($mil.) 862.22 260.02 1694.81 830.87 97.13 1607.09 162.89 0.0210
Tobin’s Q 2.15 1.48 2.00 1.78 0.63 4.23 0.85 0.0046
Book-to-market 0.69 0.54 0.79 0.57 0.59 1.54 -0.05 0.3878
Growth 1.17 1.05 0.89 1.17 1.01 1.42 0.04 0.1578
ROA -0.003 0.03 0.19 -0.15 -0.00 0.62 0.03 0.0034
Book Leverage 0.54 0.39 0.69 1.78 0.63 4.23 -0.24 0.3709
Leverage 1.37 0.52 7.76 0.22 0.16 1.91 0.36 0.2364
Market Leverage 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.19 0.0635
Cash (% Assets) 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.29 0.16 0.29 -0.07 0.0157
Dividend Yield 2.33 1.73 1.98 0.02 0.00 0.12 1.73 0.0077
Payout 0.05 0.06 0.69 -0.01 0.00 0.47 0.06 0.6245
R&D 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.30 0.08 0.9443
Profit -0.69 0.03 2.71 -0.07 0.03 0.37 0.00 0.2636
Assets ($mil.) 1670.56 380.50 5242.40 1364.16 162.03 3203.39 218.47 0.0108
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 12: Firm characteristics during crisis period 2007 - 2013 using propen-
sity score matching
This table reports the results gained using propensity score matching approach. For a set of 263 target
firms, we match them with 545 nontarget firms using propensity score during 2007 to 2013. In the
model, we include firm characteristics, industry, and year. All variables are well-defined in Appendix
table ??. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of statistical significance.
Variables Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-test
LMV
Unmatched 4.898 6.588 -1.689 0.304 -5.54
ATT 5.283 5.62 -0.342 0.476 -0.72
LSales
Unmatched 18.63 20.232 -1.599 0.347 -4.60
ATT 18.811 19.57 -0.762 0.556 -1.37
Growth
Unmatched 2.123 1.275 0.848 0.433 1.96
ATT 1.145 1.421 -0.275 0.231 -1.19
Profit
Unmatched -0.964 -0.159 -.804 0.288 -2.79
ATT -0.052 -0.633 0.580 0.414 1.40
ROA
Unmatched -0.228 0.0155 -0.244 0.074 -3.26
ATT 0.008 -0.106 0.114 0.087 1.32
Tobin’s Q
Unmatched 2.22 2.811 -.587 0.426 -1.38
ATT 2.476 2.302 .173 0.891 0.19
Book/Market
Unmatched 0.342 0.576 -0.233 0.189 -1.23
ATT 0.530 0.693 -0.163 0.164 -0.99
Book Leverage Unmatched 0.503 0.328 0.175 0.085 2.13
ATT 0.274 0.390 -0.116 0.113 -1.03
Market
Leverage
Unmatched 0.268 0.193 0.074 0.045 1.63
ATT 0.148 0.218 -0.070 0.068 -1.02
Leverage
Unmatched 2.700 2.509 0.191 0.347 0.55
ATT 3.252 3.330 -0.078 0.800 -0.10
Dividend Yield
Unmatched 0.282 0.260 0.022 0.149 0.15
ATT 0.201 0.00 0.201 0.121 1.65
R&D
Unmatched 0.194 0.072 0.122 0.048 2.53
ATT 0.103 0.116 -0.0131 0.051 -0.26
CapEx
Unmatched 4.938 5.692 -0.754 1.406 -0.54
ATT 5.371 5.36 0.0111 2.828 0.00
LAssets
Unmatched 19.037 20.387 -1.350 0.3134 -4.31
ATT 19.046 19.749 -0.702 0.487 -1.44
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Table 13: CARs for multiple event windows and statistical significance
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns for multiple event-windows and their statistical signifi-
cance for a sample of 551 firms targeted over the period of January 2000 to December 2013. The longest
event window spans over (–20, +5) or 26 days. The event date is the day, when an activist officially
announces its holding in target firm upon crossing 5% or more ownership stake. The price data to
compute daily returns is extracted by using Thomson Reuters Datastream. ***, **, * Indicates 1%, 5%,
and 10% level of significance.
Event Window CARs
(-20, +5) 5.34% ***
(-10, +5) 5.14%***
(-10, +10) 5.43%***
(0, +15) 2.80%***
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Table 14: Cross-section of CARs and types of activism
The following table reports the OLS regression results. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns computed at multiple event-windows
around the announcement dates in the short-run. We regress CARs obtained from various event-windows against well- defined types of activism
and estimates are illustrated in four models. All regression control for the size of firm, industry and year fixed effects. Firm size (logarithm of
market capitalization), and long-term debt (ratio of the natural logarithm of long-term debt to the sum of the natural logarithm of total debt and
market value of equity) are deviated from median value. The activism categories are general undervaluation, capital structure, business strategy,
the sale of the target firm, and corporate governance. All categories are non-mutually exclusive. The types of activism are dummies; General
Undervaluation is set to 1 if fund simply states its objective in its transaction purpose to value maximize without any confrontation or future
strategic plan, 0 otherwise; Capital Structure is equal to 1, if fund targets the company with clear stated goal of changing in capital structure in
its purpose of transaction, 0 otherwise; Business Strategy is set to 1, if fund explicitly describes it objective as to make changes in targets business
direction, 0 otherwise; Sale of Target is set to 1, if fund mentions its goal to sell partially or fully its target, 0 otherwise; Corporate Governance is
equal to 1, if fund describes its objective to involve in its target governance matters, 0 otherwise. The cumulative abnormal returns are regressed
into four separate models with multiple event windows of (-20,+5), (-10,+10), (-10,+5), and (0, +15). The standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance.
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Different Event-Windows
CAR(-20,+5) CAR(-10,+5) CAR(-10,+10) CAR(0,+15)
Independent Variables Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
LMV -0.026*** 0.008 -0.017*** 0.006 -0.017** 0.007 -0.010* 0.005
LTD 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002
General Undervaluation 0.028* 0.015 0.039*** 0.011 0.042*** 0.012 0.019* 0.010
Capital Structure 0.122** 0.050 0.095** 0.047 0.077 0.050 -0.028 0.065
Business Strategy 0.092** 0.038 0.075** 0.034 0.079** 0.039 0.033 0.028
Sale of target 0.044 0.035 0.015 0.025 0.031 0.027 0.046** 0.019
Governance 0.019 0.048 0.011 0.028 0.008 0.041 0.004 0.049
Year Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y
Observations 355 355 355 355
R2 0.090 0.108 0.082 0.027
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.094 0.068 0.013
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Table 15: Cross–section of CARs and types of activism – crisis effect
This table reports the OLS regression results for the cross-section of CARs as dependent variable against the well-defined categories of activism
for various event windows. Following the specification of Maier et al. (2011), the crisis dummy is set to 1 if the observation falls in the period from
July 2007 to December 2013. We incorporate crisis dummy. All regression control for the size of firm, industry and year fixed effects. Firm size
(logarithm of market capitalization), and long-term debt (ratio of the natural logarithm of long-term debt to the sum of natural logarithm of total
debt and market value of equity) deviate from the median value. The activism categories are general undervaluation, capital structure, business
strategy, the sale of the target firm, corporate governance, and Chapter 11. All categories are non-mutually exclusive. The types of activism are
dummies which take value 1 if an activist explicitly states its objective to intervene in a firm with pre-specified purpose. The cumulative abnormal
returns are regressed into four separate models with multiple event windows of (-20,+5), (-10,+10), (-10,+5), and (0, +15). The standard errors
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical
significance.
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Different Event-Windows
VARIABLES CARs (-20, +5) CARs (-10, +5) CARs (-10,+10) CARs (0,+15)
Crisis 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.139***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029)
MV -0.013** -0.011* -0.013* -0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LEV 0.141*** 0.040 0.049 0.083
(0.051) (0.040) (0.039) (0.051)
General Undervaluation -0.052 -0.004 -0.043 -0.045
(0.044) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045)
Capital Structure 0.023 -0.019 -0.019 0.004
(0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067)
Business Strategy 0.033 0.048 0.050 0.013
(0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039)
Target Sale 0.001 0.047 0.041 0.036
(0.065) (0.058) (0.053) (0.071)
Governance -0.037 -0.017 -0.029 -0.034
(0.045) (0.042) (0.047) (0.046)
Chapter 11 -0.043 -0.062 -0.079 -0.150**
(0.075) (0.064) (0.064) (0.071)
Year Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y
Observations 355 355 355 355
Adjusted R-squared 0.095 0.172 0.165 0.104
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Table 16: Cross–section of CARs and activism types – Crisis interactive terms
This table reports the OLS regression results for the cross-section of CARs as dependent variable against the well-defined categories of activism
for various event windows. Following the specification of Maier et al. (2011) study, the crisis dummy is set to 1 if the observation falls in the period
from July 2007 to December 2013. To assess the crisis effect, we create crisis interaction dummies for each category. All regression control for
the size of firm, industry and year fixed effects. MV (logarithm of market capitalization), and LEV (ratio of the natural logarithm of long-term
debt to the sum of the natural logarithm of total debt and market value of equity) have deviated from mean value. The activism categories are
General Undervaluation, Capital Structure, Business Strategy, Target Sale, Corporate Governance, and Chapter 11. All categories are non-mutually
exclusive. The types of activism are dummies which take value 1 if an activist explicitly states its objective to intervene in a firm with pre-specified
purpose. The cumulative abnormal returns are regressed into four separate models with multiple event windows of (-20,+5), (-10,+10), (-10,+5),
and (0, +15). The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 10%,
5%, and 1% level of statistical significance.
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Different Event-Windows
Variables CARs (-20, +5) CARs (-10, +5) CARs (-10, +10) CARs (0, +15)
MV -0.012* -0.011* -0.011* -0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
LEV 0.131*** 0.041 0.041 0.085
(0.048) (0.039) (0.039) (0.051)
General Value* Crisis 0.043 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.078**
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032)
Capital Structure* Crisis 0.122 0.001 0.001 0.132
(0.097) (0.089) (0.089) (0.105)
Business Strategy* Crisis 0.134** 0.137** 0.137** 0.124*
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.067)
Target Sale* Crisis 0.070 0.092 0.092 0.131*
(0.066) (0.057) (0.057) (0.071)
Governance* Crisis 0.025 0.050 0.050 0.042
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.062)
Chapter 11* Crisis 0.097* 0.053 0.053 0.019
(0.052) (0.042) (0.042) (0.049)
Year Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y
Observations 355 355 355 355
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.170 0.170 0.092
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Table 17: Cross-section of CARs and activism types with crisis interactive terms using full model specification
We regress CARs obtained from multiple event-windows against types of activism with crisis interactive terms in three separate models.
Following the specification of Maier et al. (2011), the crisis dummy is set to 1 if a firm is targeted during the period from July 2007 to
December 2013. In the model I, column (1), we regress CARs for 26 days using full specifications including crisis, industry and year fixed
effects. For column (2), we do not include crisis since it is highly correlated with types of activism, and year fixed effects. In column (3),
we do not include crisis dummy, industry, and year fixed effects. We exercise similar model specifications for CARs for (-10, +5), and (-10,
+10) event-windows. All regressions control for size and leverage which are not reported for the sake of space. The standard errors are ad-
justed for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance.
CARs(-20, +5) CARs(-10, +5) CARs(-10, +10)
Independent
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gen. Undervaluation -0.032 -0.090** -0.011 -0.015 -0.062 0.019 -0.027 -0.107** -0.007
(0.052) (0.045) (0.032) (0.045) (0.041) (0.029) (0.053) (0.049) (0.035)
Capital Structure 0.044 0.003 0.030 0.015 -0.006 0.027 0.016 -0.034 0.004
(0.062) (0.069) (0.065) (0.078) (0.077) (0.074) (0.082) (0.084) (0.079)
Business Strategy -0.013 -0.045 0.000 0.005 -0.030 0.016 -0.016 -0.064 -0.010
(0.048) (0.044) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.049) (0.045) (0.044)
Target Sale 0.004 -0.024 0.001 0.037 0.019 0.036 0.026 -0.012 0.022
(0.063) (0.078) (0.069) (0.070) (0.075) (0.062) (0.066) (0.087) (0.074)
Governance -0.043 -0.053 -0.010 -0.051 -0.061 -0.019 -0.042 -0.060 -0.013
(0.054) (0.062) (0.061) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.060) (0.066) (0.064)
Chapter 11 -0.027 0.016 0.013 -0.054 -0.000 0.032 -0.144 -0.080 -0.057
(0.093) (0.071) (0.046) (0.091) (0.062) (0.047) (0.096) (0.070) (0.050)
Crisis 0.114 - - 0.020 - - 0.145 - -
(0.114) - - (0.100) - - (0.125) - -
Gen. Value* Crisis 0.035 0.061* 0.061* 0.022 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.035 0.097*** 0.094***
(0.083) (0.034) (0.034) (0.078) (0.027) (0.026) (0.089) (0.035) (0.035)
Capital Structure* Crisis 0.005 0.070 0.068 0.068 0.026 0.037 0.028 0.107 0.106
(0.129) (0.116) (0.107) (0.126) (0.114) (0.103) (0.141) (0.128) (0.121)
Bus. Strategy* Crisis 0.079 0.155** 0.126* 0.090 0.151** 0.123* 0.058 0.159** 0.128
(0.074) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.068) (0.071) (0.081) (0.077) (0.079)
Target Sale* Crisis 0.021 0.045 0.064 0.002 0.038 0.063 0.005 0.082 0.101
(0.111) (0.091) (0.090) (0.103) (0.084) (0.080) (0.122) (0.101) (0.095)
Governance* Crisis 0.019 0.038 0.027 0.069 0.084 0.073 0.022 0.054 0.050
(0.084) (0.084) (0.081) (0.084) (0.068) (0.071) (0.094) (0.089) (0.087)
Default* Crisis - - - - - - - - -
Industry Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N
Year Y N N Y N N Y N N
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
Adjusted R-squared 0.184 0.089 0.064 0.224 0.169 0.119 0.191 0.092 0.065
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Table 18: Long-term performance in target firms – Time series analysis
We report the results obtained from using propensity score matching approach in time-series setting. Target firms are matched with industry
peers based on firm characteristics, 2-digit SIC codes in a similar year using propensity score. The dependent variable is the net difference between
the firm characteristic in the year after activism minus year before activism. The independent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if a firm is
targeted in the year before activism, 0 otherwise. The coefficient on Activism Dummy is interpreted as the average effect of activism after one
year. For each regression, we use a vector of control variables including industry, and year fixed effects. Firm characteristics are well-defined in
Appendix table 2. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate
10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance.
Dependent Variable
Change in firm characteristic one year after activism
Size Valuation Operational Efficiency Distribution Investment Profitability
Independent
Variable
MV Sales Q BM Growth Cash DY Payout R&D CapEx Profit Margin
ATET
Activism Dummy -685.6 52.27 -2.139 -0.876 -0.287 -0.227*** -0.484 -2.552 -0.0765 1.727*** 10.33*
(741.0) (568.0) (1.460) (0.625) (0.393) (0.0804) (0.383) (4.653) (0.0847) (0.505) (5.692)
# Observations 121 122 118 121 115 51 188 102 97 110 113
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Table 19: Long-term performance of target firms after activsim – Cross-sectional analysis
The following table presents one-year performance in target firms using propensity score approach in the cross-sectional setting. Each target firm
is matched with a nontarget firm using propensity score. The dependent variable is a change in the firm characteristic in excess of matching
firm in one year after the activism. The independent variable is Activism Dummy which takes value 1 if a firm has been targeted in the year
before activism. To control for fixed effects, we include firm size both in linear and quadratic form, industry, and year dummies. We winsorize size
variable at standard 1%. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, and ***
indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance.
Dependent Variable
Change in firm characteristic after one year compared to matching firm
Size Valuation Profitability Leverage Distribution Investment
Ind. Variable
MV Sales Assets Q BM Growth ROA Profit LEV ML Cash Divid. Yield Payout CapEx R&D
ATET
Activism Dummy 1,739.880* 79.750 -757.301 -3.958 2.972* -1.119 53.456** 12.686 -2.439 -0.385* -0.418 -0.900 -1.812 1.792 0.010
(1,041.461) (293.164) (466.532) (4.113) (1.615) (0.949) (21.125) (11.605) (1.777) (0.230) (0.468) (0.628) (7.109) (17.662) (0.136)
# Observations 77 121 116 102 91 61 88 78 75 33 117 83 91 61 74
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Table 20: Characteristics of targets in first year post-activism — Time series analysis
The table reports the characteristics of target firms for the year after activism and compares it with a matching sample based on size/book-to-
market/2-digit SIC industry. The sample consists of 551 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013. The Market Value is a
firm’s stock price times number of shares outstanding and measured in dollars. Sales represent a firm’s annual sales in dollars. Tobin’s Q is defined
as (long-term debt + the market value of equity/ long term debt + the book value of equity). The Book-to-Market ratio is expressed as the book
value of equity/market value of equity. Sales Growth is the annual percentage growth in sales. Book Leverage is defined as debt/(debt + book
value of equity), Leverage is measured total debts / total equity, Market Leverage is defined as debt/ (debt + market value of equity), Cash as
a percentage of assets is defined (cash + cash equivalents)/assets, Dividend Yield is defined as (common dividend + preferred dividend)/(market
value of common stock + market value of preferred stock), Payout is defined as total dividend / net income before extraordinary items, Capital
Expenses are measured as a percentage of assets, Research and Development is measured as a percentage of assets, Profitability is operating profit
margin and measured as EBIT / Net sales. The entire set of data is derived from Thomson Reuters DataStream. We report the mean, median,
and standard deviation for both target and nontarget samples. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians between the target and matched
firm, and column VIII reports the p-value to demonstrate the level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 982.66 257.78 2,332.29 828.22 194.16 2,032.86 63.62 0.0675
Sales ($mil.) 880.09 273.44 1,672.67 550.80 66.35 1,172.26 207.09 0.0000
Tobin’s Q 2.90 1.48 6.28 3.15 1.57 8.42 -0.090 0.4687
Book-to-market -2.74 0.48 41.01 0.18 0.47 5.63 0.01 0.0000
Growth 1.10 1.02 0.81 1.15 1.07 1.06 -0.05 0.3178
ROA -0.10 0.03 0.76 -20.42 0.00 74.41 0.03 0.0037
Book Leverage 0.58 0.31 1.77 1.58 0.91 3.74 -0.6 0.0000
Leverage 0.32 0.24 0.41 0.33 0.19 0.71 0.05 0.1913
Market Leverage 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.03 0.25 0.18 0.0005
Cash (% Assets) 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.27 -0.11 0.0000
Dividend Yield 0.46 0.00 1.35 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.0143
Payout 6.09 0.00 17.19 3.51 0.00 13.55 0.00 0.2740
Capital Exp. 4.14 1.90 6.52 42.86 2.12 99.27 -0.22 0.1573
R&D 0.10 0.01 0.24 0.13 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.0916
Profit -1.90 0.04 12.07 0.86 1.00 1.93 -0.96 0.0000
Assets ($mil.) 1,466.47 297.97 4,209.40 906.89 114.48 2,774.57 183.49 0.0001
Liquidity 8.83 2.06 60.39 3.39 2.03 4.63 0.030 0.8697
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 21: Changes in characteristics in year before and after activism — Cross-sectional analysis
This table presents the difference in medians of targets and nontargets in year before and after activism. The targets are matched with peers
based on size/book-to-market/2-digit SIC industry. The sample consists of 551 firms targeted by 112 hedge funds over the period of 2000 to 2013.
The entire set of data is retrieved from using Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report the mean, median, and standard deviation for both target
and nontarget samples. Column I and II report the differences in means and medians for targets, column III and IV presents differences in means
and medians for nontarget firms. Column V exhibits the difference in change in medians and VI reports the Wilcoxon signrank test p–values to
demonstrate level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
(After-Before Activism) (After-Before Activism) Wilcoxon signrank test
∆Mean ∆Median ∆ Mean ∆Median ∆ Difference p-val
∆Market Value (mil.) -5.20 0.00 108.00 76.17 -76.17 0.2565
∆Sales (mil.) 10.87 -5.76 62.88 26.01 -31.77 0.6875
∆Tobin’s Q 0.34 -0.070 -1.02 -0.80 0.73 0.0282
∆Book-to-market -1.64 0.03 -1.55 -0.04 0.07 0.0085
∆Growth -0.01 -0.02 -5E+14 -0.05 0.03 0.0190
∆ROA -0.06 0.00 20.24 -0.01 0.01 0.0510
∆Book Leverage 0.12 0.02 0.55 -0.14 0.16 0.3148
∆Leverage -0.51 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.2112
∆Market Leverage 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.7394
∆Cash (% Assets) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.7275
∆Dividend Yield 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.8139
∆Payout 6.09 0.00 -3.34 0.00 0.00 0.7749
∆Capital Exp. 4.01 1.89 -42.74 -2.11 4.00 0.0108
∆R&D 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.8347
∆Profit 0.72 0.00 -7.18 -0.99 0.99 0.0000
∆Assets (mil.) 40.26 -58.64 12.15 5.95 -64.59 0.9341
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 22: Impact of crisis on target firms performance – time series analysis
The table reports the difference in medians between two sub-groups in target firms before and after the crisis period. For pre- crisis period, we
include all firms targeted during 2000 to 2006. For post-crisis period, we include firms targeted within 2007 to 2013. The data on accounting
measures is retrieved from using Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report the mean, median, and standard deviation for both subsamples.
Column I to III report the mean, median, and standard devidation for target firms before crisis period, and from column IV to VI mean, median,
and standard deviation for target firms during and after crisis period are presented. Column VII exhibits the difference in medians and VIII reports
the Wilcoxon signedrank test p-values to demonstrate level of significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm characteristics are
well-defined in Appendix table ??.
Characteristics
Post-crisis target firms Pre-crisis target firms Median comparison1
Mean Median Sd. Mean Median Sd. Difference p-val
Market Value ($mil.) 5.77 5.61 2.12 5.27 5.28 1.83 0.33 0.0877
Sales ($mil.) 5.81 5.91 2.38 5.55 5.70 1.87 0.21 0.0861
Tobin’s Q 1.88 1.51 2.08 1.72 1.41 1.17 0.1 0.7609
Book-to-Market 0.58 0.52 1.54 0.53 0.51 1.05 0.01 0.4527
Growth 1.15 1.05 0.62 1.12 1.04 0.44 0.01 0.8995
ROA -0.22 0.01 1.04 -0.00 0.05 0.20 -0.04 0.0092
Book Leverage 0.54 0.37 1.03 0.47 0.39 0.54 -0.02 0.7567
Leverage 2.74 1.97 2.34 0.31 0.28 0.27 1.69 0.0000
Market Leverage 0.31 0.21 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.30 -0.06 0.2653
Cash (% Assets) 0.68 0.08 2.05 0.70 0.01 2.53 0.07 0.1123
Dividend Yield 0.30 0.00 0.87 0.54 0.00 1.32 0.00 0.0260
Capital Exp. 5.95 2.43 11.72 0.05 0.03 0.07 2.4 0.0000
R&D 0.15 0.02 0.38 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.0020
Profit -0.50 0.03 1.80 -0.11 0.05 1.16 -0.02 0.0059
Assets ($mil.) 6.23 6.34 2.17 5.92 5.93 1.52 0.41 0.0297
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 23: Impact of crisis on target firms performance — Cross-sectional analysis
The table reports the difference in medians between two sub-groups in target firms before and after the crisis period in excess of matching
sample firms. We compare target firms with matching sample firms based size/book-to-market value/ 2-digit SIC industry codes. For pre- crisis
period, we include all firms targeted during 2000 to 2006. For post-crisis period, we include firms targeted within 2007 to 2013. The data on
accounting measures is retrieved from using Thomson Reuters Datastream. We report difference in means, medians, and standard deviations for
both subsamples. Column I to III report the difference in means, medians, and standard devidations for target firms for the period ((2007–13) -
(2000–06)) and from column IV to VI difference in means, medians, and standard deviations for nontarget firms for the period during ((2007–13)
- (2000–06)). Column VII exhibits the difference in medians and VIII reports the Wilcoxon signedrank test p-values to demonstrate level of
significance in medians. All variables are winsorized at 1%. Firm characteristics are well-defined in Appendix table ??.
Characteristics
Target firms Matching firms Median comparison1
Wilcoxon signrank test
∆Mean ∆Median ∆Sd ∆ Mean ∆Median ∆Sd ∆ Difference p-val
∆Market Value (mil.) 1.26 1.64 2.89 0.29 0.24 2.43 1.40 0.0164
∆Sales (mil.) 1.17 1.21 3.51 1.20 0.81 3.20 0.40 0.8490
∆Tobin’s Q 0.36 0.29 2.70 -1.12 -0.37 2.97 0.66 0.0023
∆Book-to-market 0.56 0.50 1.55 0.51 0.51 1.04 -0.01 0.4679
∆Growth -0.21 -0.05 1.72 -0.11 0.01 1.21 -0.06 0.9916
∆ROA -0.22 -0.01 1.13 -0.03 0.04 0.22 -0.05 0.0860
∆Book Leverage 0.52 0.36 1.04 -0.69 0.00 1.89 0.36 0.0000
∆Leverage 2.29 1.60 2.49 0.06 0.07 0.41 1.53 0.0000
∆Market Leverage 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.17 0.13 0.39 -0.03 0.2419
∆Cash (% Assets) 0.43 -0.11 2.56 0.02 -0.11 1.08 0.00 0.4997
∆Dividend Yield 0.36 0.00 0.95 0.50 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.1898
∆Capital Exp. 4.10 2.37 5.07 -0.03 -0.00 0.14 2.37 0.0000
∆R&D 0.02 0.00 0.54 -0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.3841
∆Profit -1.75 -1.10 2.33 -1.32 -0.98 1.86 -0.12 0.8367
∆Assets (mil.) 1.16 1.32 2.86 1.14 1.00 2.41 0.32 0.4459
1 Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians between the target and the matched firms.
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Table 24: Performance of target firms before and after the crisis – Time series analysis
We regress change in characteristics in firms targeted during 2006 and 2007 after two years of activism (i.e., in years
2008 and 2009) against a set of dummies and vecotor of control specfications. In vector of dummies we include ′Fund
Presence in Y eart – is dummy which is equal to 1 if an activist exists in target firm in first year of activism. Fund
Presence in Y eart+1 — is dummy which takes value 1 if activist fund exists in target firm in second year of activism.
Activist Hedge Fund – is dummy which is equal to 1 if another activist fund (fund out of sample) targets the firm
during 2006 and 2007. In vector of control variables, we include firm size which is measured as natural logarithm of
market capitalization. Firm age is measured using Compustat definition; firm year minus year of first stock price and
incorporated into the model in natural logarithm form. Q and Book/Market value indicate firm valuation, ROA and
Profit Margin show firm profitability, debt capacity is represented by Book Leverage, firm distribution policy is illustrated
by Dividend Yield, and investment in target firm is measured by means of Research and Development, and Capital
Expenditure. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedas-
ticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. ***, **, * indicates the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of statistical significance.
Valuation Profitability Debt Distribution Investment
Variables Q Book/Market ROA Profit Margin Book Leverage Divid. Yield R&D Capital Exp.
Fund Presence in
Yeart
-1.332 1.430 0.711** 1.636* 0.108 0.264 0.463* 0.052
(1.431) (1.761) (0.305) (0.865) (0.414) (0.334) (0.227) (0.050)
Fund Presence in
Yeart+1
1.086 -0.006 -0.171 -0.215 -0.174 -0.468** -0.338* -0.005
(0.845) (0.629) (0.178) (0.183) (0.271) (0.178) (0.192) (0.021)
Activist Hedge
Fund
-0.571 -1.131 0.120 0.262 0.176 0.070 0.222 -0.017
(0.668) (0.904) (0.194) (0.282) (0.310) (0.132) (0.199) (0.020)
MV -0.319 -0.248 -0.091 -0.246 0.167 0.021 -0.044 -0.001
(0.313) (0.477) (0.081) (0.209) (0.126) (0.075) (0.096) (0.010)
Firm Age 1.546 -1.695 -0.253 -0.784 0.119 -0.534*** -0.096 0.004
(1.083) (1.371) (0.201) (0.624) (0.266) (0.184) (0.194) (0.025)
Constant -6.012 5.389* -0.022 0.481 0.240 1.772*** -0.054 -0.105
(3.495) (2.920) (0.463) (1.079) (0.553) (0.426) (0.572) (0.073)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 26 30 30 29 30 30 26 30
Adjusted R-squared 0.098 0.355 -0.069 0.168 -0.128 0.525 -0.125 0.184
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Table 25: Performance of target firms before and after the crisis – Cross-sectional analysis
The table reports the estimates for net change in characteristics in firms targeted in 2006 and 2007 after two years of fund
activism (i.e., in years 2008 and 2009) against a set of dummies and vecotor of control specfications. In vector of dummies
we include ′Fund Presence in Yeart – which is equal to 1 if an activist exists in target firm in first year of activism. Fund
Presence in Y eart+1 – is dummy which takes value 1 if activist fund exists in target firm in second year of activism. Activist
Hedge Fund– is dummy which is equal to 1 if another activist fund (fund out of sample) targets the firm during 2006 and
2007. In vector of control variables, we include firm size which is measured as natural logarithm of market capitalization.
Firm age is measured using Compustat definition which is firm year minus year of first stock price and incorporated into
the model in natural logarithm form. We regress two separate models for each firm characteristic; first with industry and
year fixed effects, second, without industry and year effects. Variables with subscript ind indicates the results without
industry and year dummies in regression. Q and Book/Market value indicate firm valuation, ROA and Profit Margin show
firm profitability, debt capacity is represented by Book Leverage, firm distribution policy is illustrated by Dividend Yield,
and investment in target firm is measured by means of Research and Development, and Capital Expenditure. The standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. ***, **, * indicates the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level of statistical significance.
Profitability Valuation Debt Investment
Independent
Variables ROA ROAind Profit Profitind Q Qind BM BMind BL BLind RD RDind CapEx CapExind
Fund Presence
in Yeart
0.36 -0.21 4.39* -0.59 0.67 0.23 0.97 0.85 -0.88 -0.81 0.88* 0.38 0.11 0.21*
(2.23) (1.12) (2.12) (1.71) (0.77) (0.38) (1.01) (0.55) (1.03) (0.67) (0.45) (0.28) (0.09) (0.10)
Fund Presence
in Yeart+1
-0.84 -0.72 -0.79 0.28 0.18 0.48 0.48 0.53 -0.70 -0.44 -0.45 -0.35 -0.03 -0.03
(1.41) (0.93) (1.43) (1.11) (0.37) (0.47) (0.41) (0.33) (0.52) (0.41) (0.28) (0.34) (0.05) (0.04)
Activist Hedge
Fund
-0.37 -0.01 0.57 -0.98 -0.03 -0.13 -0.39 -0.47 -0.21 -0.31 0.69 0.29 -0.06 -0.03
(1.10) (0.89) (1.44) (1.50) (0.61) (0.35) (0.37) (0.30) (0.73) (0.42) (0.58) (0.39) (0.05) (0.03)
MV -0.78 -0.43 -1.67 -0.71 -0.38 -0.24 0.16 0.14 -0.31 -0.36 0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.00
(0.91) (0.51) (1.04) (0.61) (0.57) (0.32) (0.24) (0.19) (0.31) (0.21) (0.31) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm Age 0.84 0.87 -2.67* -0.43 0.12 0.29 0.02 0.18 -0.56 -0.35 -0.42 -0.12 0.08 0.04
(1.35) (0.98) (1.48) (1.03) (0.42) (0.46) (0.65) (0.48) (0.59) (0.42) (0.28) (0.27) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant -4.13 -2.52 2.89 0.81 -2.04 -0.93 0.22 -0.28 1.80 1.81 1.28 0.03 -0.37** -0.29**
(3.84) (2.58) (4.70) (2.90) (2.85) (1.15) (1.58) (1.28) (1.55) (1.15) (1.78) (0.69) (0.15) (0.13)
Industry Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Year Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
# Observations 25 25 30 30 30 30 29 29 30 30 26 26 30 30
Adjusted R-squared -0.30 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 0.10 0.14 0.10 -0.17 -0.03 0.19 0.18
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Table 26: Abnormal returns and types of activism – Impact of large holding
in firm
The table reports the coefficients for types of activism by regressing CARs obtained from multiple
event-windows. We present type of activism using dummy which takes value one if an activist fund
explicitly describes its purpose of the transaction in Schedule 13D filing. Variable 13F is a dummy
which is equal to 1 if a fund holds more than $1 million in target firm before filing Schedule 13D to
the SEC of the US. The variable pre-activism return presents the six-months daily average returns’
performance prior to Schedule 13D filing. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
reported in parentheses for each coefficient. *, **, *** illustrate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical
significance.
Dependent Variables
Cumulative abnormal returns on different event-windows
Independent
Variables CARs (-20, +5) CARs (-10, +5) CARs (0, +15)
LMV 0.004 0.000 -0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
LTD 0.156*** 0.038 -0.009
(0.052) (0.037) (0.037)
Pre–activism Return 4.594 -0.910 -5.348*
(4.765) (3.412) (3.412)
13F 0.003 -0.002 -0.021
(0.032) (0.023) (0.023)
General Undervaluation 0.072* 0.049** 0.046*
(0.054) (0.038) (0.036)
Capital Structure 0.041** 0.002** 0.053*
(0.076) (0.054) (0.049)
Business Strategy 0.026** 0.023** 0.024**
(0.047) (0.034) (0.032)
Target Sale -0.027 0.033 0.005
(0.077) (0.055) (0.051)
Governance -0.043 -0.058 -0.058
(0.057) (0.041) (0.027)
Chapter 11 -0.056 -0.128 0.352**
(0.287) (0.206) (0.177)
Industry Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y
Observations 324 324 297
Adjusted R-squared 0.170 0.237 0.100
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Table 27: Size and leverage effect on cross-section of abnormal returns during
crisis period
We regress multiple event-windows against a set of activism types with crisis interaction terms. Types
of activism and crisis are presented by means of a dummy. Crisis period covers from July 2007 to
December 2013. We do not report vector of control variables which includes size, leverage, average
6-months daily pre-activism returns, Schedule 13F, industry and year fixed effects for the sake of space.
Firm size and leverage are in natural logarithmic form and demeaned. The standard errors are adjusted
for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses for each coefficient. ***, **, * demonstrate 1%, 5%,
and 10% level of statistical significance.
Dependent Variable
Independent
Variables CARs(−20,+5) CARs(−10,+5) CARs(−10,+10)
Crisis 0.189 0.128 0.128
(0.154) (0.117) (0.117)
General Undervaluation -0.026 -0.005 -0.005
(0.070) (0.058) (0.058)
Capital Structure 0.044 -0.002 -0.002
(0.090) (0.109) (0.109)
Business Strategy -0.014 0.006 0.006
(0.069) (0.048) (0.048)
Target Sale -0.022 0.046 0.046
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Governance -0.056 -0.064 -0.064
(0.083) (0.061) (0.061)
Chapter 11 - - -
General Value* Crisis -0.094 -0.102 -0.102
(0.116) (0.094) (0.094)
Capital Structure* Crisis 0.011 0.003 0.003
(0.133) (0.127) (0.127)
Business Strategy* Crisis 0.148 0.077 0.077
(0.105) (0.082) (0.082)
Target Sale* Crisis 0.026 -0.099 -0.099
(0.148) (0.124) (0.124)
Governance* Crisis 0.004 -0.019 -0.019
(0.128) (0.092) (0.092)
Default* Crisis - - -
General Value* Crisis* MV -0.027 -0.024 -0.024
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
Business Strategy* Crisis* MV 0.003 0.010 0.010
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020)
Target Sale* Crisis* MV 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Governance* Crisis* MV 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Default* Crisis* MV -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Structure* Crisis* Lev 0.824*** 0.437** 0.437**
(0.296) (0.215) (0.215)
Default * Crisis * Levg - - -
Observations 324 324 324
Adjusted R-squared 0.119 0.185 0.185
